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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Lisa Beth Lombardo 
 
Master of Science 
 
Environmental Studies Program 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: “The Flukishness of Being Related”: Biosemiotics, Naturecultures, and Irony in the 
Art of Nina Katchadourian 
 
 
 This thesis contends that Nina Katchadourian’s oeuvre can be read as subtly 
breaking down problematic assumptions about nature in Western thought.  The second 
chapter draws on biosemiotics, which redefines life as semiosis, and trans-corporeality, 
which reconceptualizes the human body as inseparable from the environment, to show 
how Katchadourian’s art routinely calls attention to non-human animal and material 
agencies. The third chapter demonstrates how Katchadourian’s work implicitly reinforces 
Donna Haraway's idea of naturecultures, which contends that nature and culture are 
mutually implicated and inextricably intertwined, through a close reading of two of 
Katchadourian’s pieces, Natural Crossdressing and Mended Spiderwebs #19 (Laundry 
Line). The fourth chapter compares the use of irony in two pieces that comment on 
Western animal classification—Chloe, by Katchadourian, and Scala Naturae, by Mark 
Dion—contending that Katchadourian’s piece demonstrates what Bronislaw Szerszynski 
terms an “ironic ecology.” 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Nina Katchadourian is a contemporary conceptual artist who works in a variety of 
media, including photography, video, sound, and sculpture. She was born in 1968 in 
Stanford, California, and currently lives in Brooklyn, New York. She is represented by 
Catherine Clark Gallery in San Francisco, California. She studied at the University of 
California in San Diego with Allan Kaprow, the performance artist who famously 
developed “happenings.” 
 In a photograph entitled What is Art? (1996/2008; Figure 1), part of 
Katchadourian’s Sorted Books series in which she organizes various collections of books 
to create short poems, Katchadourian sums up her approach to making art: by closely 
observing the everyday world.1 As one critic writes, Katchadourian’s “processes precede 
the diverse media in which she has worked”: she often draws directly from her 
environment to create her pieces, engaging with whatever happens to be at hand, whether 
it’s someone else’s book collection, caterpillars, or discarded audio tape found on the 
street (Dillon 70). Katchadourian typically employs a light touch in creating her work, 
using minimal means to create meaning. Perhaps because the simple interventions she 
performs are anti-heroic—she does not pretend to be creating art to end all art—
Katchadourian’s pieces are generally quite accessible to viewers. In fact, Katchadourian’s 
strategy of paying close attention to her often mundane surroundings in order to “find” art 
in what is often overlooked invites viewers to have a similar relationship to the world. 
                                                 
1
 Katchadourian’s process is clearly influenced by her mentor, Kaprow, who advocated for “models for 
experimental arts [to be] less the preceding arts than modern society itself,” expressing his hope that “this 
may connect us with natural processes beyond society” (xv). He wrote of experimental artists, “these bold 
creators show us, as if for the first time, the world we have always had about us but ignored” (9). 
2 
Figure 1: What is Art? (1996/2008) by Nina Katchadourian 
Her Sorted Books series, for example, has inspired other people to sort their own books 
into short poems.2 
 
 Katchadourian is not usually categorized as an environmental artist because her 
work does not explicitly address typical environmental issues3 such as climate change or 
biodiversity loss, nor does it utilize narratives of environmental crisis and moralism.4 
                                                 
2
  Examples of viewers of Katchadourian’s work sorting their own books are documented on Flickr 
(http://www.flickr.com/groups/sortedbooks/pool/tags/books/) and on blogs such as Stuck in a Book and 
Read 52 Books in 52 Weeks. 
 
3
 By “typical environmental issues” I mean environmental problems as they are framed in the 
technoscientific/ capitalist discourse so dominant in Western culture. This is not to dismiss these issues, but 
to suggest that they are not the only environmental issues, and that the way they are often framed (as 
having a technological or consumerist solution, for example) is symptomatic of more fundamental issues, 
such as how Western culture views and represents “nature” in the first place.   
 
4
 Art critic and curator Jan Avgikos critiques much “green art” for “turning just causes into art and art into a 
just cause” by “remind[ing] us how sweet and fragile (or how virile and powerful) nature can be […] and 
how good it could be. Then terrify[ing] us with how bad it’s gonna be” (108). In an interview, 
Katchadourian differentiates her art from “didactic art,” stating that she prefers to “traffic in a kind of 
deliberate ambiguity” (“Seat Assignment-Nina Katchadourian”) 
3 
However, Katchadourian’s process of close observation, which leads to “collaborations”5 
with non-human creatures and self-conscious interventions in the naturalcultural world to 
create art, problematizes mechanistic and dualistic views of nature and living beings. 
Katchadourian’s work routinely calls attention to minute demonstrations of non-human 
agency, to the compelling inadequacies of human language and systems of 
representation, and to “unpredictable affinities among people, animals, plants, minerals, 
manufactured objects, words, and noises” (Richard 46). In this way, Katchadourian’s art-
making process can be read as practicing ways of viewing the natural world and its 
inhabitants, including ourselves, that subtly call into question dominant dualistic Western 
views of nature. 
 In this thesis, I put Katchadourian’s work in conversation with theory that 
attempts to break down problematic assumptions about nature in Western thought. In 
Chapter II, I relate Katchadourian’s work to biosemiotics, a field of study founded on the 
idea that all life is constantly involved in the interpretation of signs and meaning, and to 
trans-corporeality, which reconceptualizes the human body as permeable and thus 
inseparable from the environment. In Chapter III, I use Donna Haraway's idea of 
naturecultures, which contends that nature and culture are mutually implicated and 
inextricably intertwined, to do a close reading of two of Katchadourian’s pieces, Natural 
Crossdressing and Mended Spiderwebs #19 (Laundry Line). In Chapter IV, I compare the 
use of irony in two pieces that comment on Western animal classification—Chloe, by 
Katchadourian, and Scala Naturae, by Mark Dion—contending that Katchadourian’s 
piece demonstrates what Bronislaw Szerszynski terms an “ironic ecology.” I conclude 
                                                 
5
 One of the categories of artwork on Katchadourian’s website is “Uninvited Collaborations with Nature,” 
while another is “Confusing Animals.” 
4 
with a brief analysis of Katchadourian’s piece Paranormal Postcards, which exemplifies 
how Katchadourian’s body of work reminds viewers that “[w]e, like the rest of nature, 
are not transcendental a priori essences, but are open processes always opening upon 
what the world affords us” (Wheeler, Creature 135). 
 
  
5 
CHAPTER II 
BIOSEMIOTICS, TRANS-CORPOREALITY, AND THE ART OF NINA 
KATCHADOURIAN  
Nina Katchadourian’s work calls attention to non-human animal and material 
agencies through her “uninvited collaborations” with animate non-human worlds and 
beings and her explorations of the failures inherent in verbal and visual representation. In 
this chapter, I examine Katchadourian’s body of work through the lenses of two theories 
that resist dualistic understandings of animals and nature: biosemiotics and trans-
corporeality. While Katchadourian’s work is, in general, quite accessible to viewers, by 
teasing out points of correspondence between these two theories and her artwork, this 
chapter seeks to add to discourse on animality and materiality that is driving a paradigm 
shift in how Western culture views the natural world. 
Biosemiotics is the study of signs, meanings, and communication among living 
organisms, “based on the recognition that life is fundamentally grounded in semiotic6 
processes” (Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics 3). Biosemiotics challenges mechanistic 
understandings of life processes, contending that biochemical explanations of life are 
incomplete without acknowledging intrinsically related biosemiotic processes 
(Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics 4). This is to say that life at every level, from the intra-cellular 
all the way up to the inter-special, is involved in the interpretation of signs and meanings.  
Biosemiotics, in fact, insists that “life is semiosis—‘signs, not molecules, are the basic 
units in the study of life [emphasis added]’” (Wheeler, Creature 123). Humans, therefore, 
are not unique in their status as subjects with the ability to interpret the world around 
them; rather, life itself is defined by this criterion. Humans, then, are unique only in the 
                                                 
6
 Semiotic: of or pertaining to (the use of) signs. 
6 
degree of their semiotic abilities (Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics 265), or “‘semiotic 
freedom’—that is to say the increase in richness or ‘depth’ of meaning that can be 
communicated” (Hoffmeyer, Signs 61). 
Biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s work on perception is one of the three main 
sources7 out of which biosemiotics developed (Wheeler, Creature 120). Von Uexküll 
theorized that all life forms experience their environment in their own subjective ways, 
based on both the particular perceptive capacities of their species (for example, hearing, 
sight, sense of smell, etc.) and on the life form’s own moods, desires, and past 
experiences. For Uexküll, even human scientists are unable to discern an objective 
environment “out there”, since they operate within their own particular subjective 
universes, what Uexkull terms “Umwelten.” Rather, there are as many overlapping 
subjective environments as there are creatures. Biosemiotics borrows from Uexküll the 
recognition that biological materiality cannot be studied without taking into account 
living beings’ subjective interpretation of their environments and interactions involving 
senses, emotions, and memories. 
The more recent theory of trans-corporeality, so-named by Stacy Alaimo,8 
similarly insists “the environment, which is too often imagined as inert, empty space or as 
a resource for human use, is, in fact, a world of fleshy beings with their own needs, 
claims, and actions” (Alaimo, Bodily Natures 2). Drawing heavily on theory from 
                                                 
7
 The other two sources are the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce and the zoosemiotics of Thomas 
Sebeok. As these two sources are less relevant to this thesis, they will not be considered except indirectly 
through their influence on other more recent biosemiotic theory.  
 
8
 Alaimo is careful to point out that she did not invent the theory of trans-corporeality; her work simply 
“examine[s] how various models of trans-corporeality are emerging not only in a broad expanse of 
scholarship and theory, but in popular culture, literary texts, and social practices. [Her] intention is not to 
conjure up a new theory so much as to work across separate fields, forging connections and suggesting 
ethical and political perspectives”(Bodily Natures 3). 
7 
corporeal feminisms, disability studies, science studies, and the environmental 
humanities, trans-corporeality is based on the recognition that the human body and the 
environment “can by no means be considered separate” due to the “significant material 
interchanges” that exist between them (Alaimo, Bodily Natures 2-3). Taking aim at the 
neatly bounded entities upon which human exceptionalism rests, trans-corporeality seeks 
to “dissolv[e] stable outlines” and reconceptualize the human as “permeable” (Alaimo, 
States of Suspension 477).  
At their core, both biosemiotics and trans-corporeality are attempts to find ways 
of thinking about the relationship between humans, other beings, and our environments 
that challenge insidious dualisms between culture and nature, discourse and materiality, 
mind and body, human and animal, and subject and object. For example, Jesper 
Hoffmeyer contends that the ecological idea of the biosphere, while meant to be holistic, 
rests on a dualistic view of materiality and signification in its total disregard for 
everything but “physico-chemical” processes (Signs vii). He proposes the idea of a 
semiosphere, a “network of communicative relations” (Signs 59) or a “world of 
signification” (Signs vii) which acknowledges the interdependency of meaning, matter, 
and living beings. Similarly, trans-corporeality seeks to establish “a posthuman 
environmental ethics in which the flows, interchanges, and interrelations between human 
corporeality and the more-than-human world resist the ideological forces of 
disconnection” (Alaimo, Bodily Natures 142).  
By bringing these two theories to my discussion of Nina Katchadourian’s work, I 
do not wish to imply that Katchdourian’s work is an illustration of the theories, that 
Katchadourian herself was familiar with them or had them in mind when she created her 
8 
pieces, or that these theories are somehow “hidden” in the artwork like a secret code. As 
both Wendy Wheeler’s book The Whole Creature and Stacy Alaimo’s book Bodily 
Natures suggest, ideas that could be called biosemiotic and/or trans-corporeal have been 
emerging from widely varying sources in the past century of Western culture. In their 
books, both Wheeler and Alaimo set out to put these ideas into dialogue with each other 
in order to document and explore what Wheeler calls a “shift in paradigmatic thought in 
Western modernity” (Creature 13). 9  Similarly, in examining Katchadourian’s work with 
biosemiotics and trans-corporeality in mind, I seek to place these roughly contemporary 
artworks and theories into dialogue, teasing out (sometimes strange and perhaps 
coincidental) affinities between them, and seeing what they have to say to each other. 
Biosemiotics 
Umwelten 
 Jakob von Uexküll writes that the mechanistic view of life that “many a zoologist 
and physiologist” hold ignores the fact that animals are not “mere machines, but […] 
subjects whose essential activity consists of perceiving and acting” (Stroll 5-6). One of 
the central and most influential points of von Uexküll’s A Stroll through the Worlds of 
Animals and Men is his assertion that all animals, including humans, perceive their 
environments differently, both as species and as individual beings; he terms each 
                                                 
9
 This is not to overstate the similarities between Alaimo’s and Wheeler’s views: Wheeler is mostly 
interested in shifts in perspective in Western scientific and intellectual communities, whereas Alaimo draws 
on much more disparate sources, including subaltern perspectives. Perhaps the particular attention Alaimo 
pays to subaltern views, such as those held by people affected by environmental racism and chemical 
sensitivity, plays into the absence of talk of any dramatic paradigm shifts in a Western culture that 
continues to operate, with horrendous (though not often immediately apparent) results, on a day-to-day 
basis on the assumption that dualisms are an accurate enough model for its purposes.  
 
9 
animal’s experience of its surroundings its Umwelt10. He writes “each subject lives in a 
world composed of subjective realities alone, and […] even the Umwelten themselves 
represent only subjective realities” (Stroll 72). This idea relates to Nina Katchadourian’s 
body of work at a fundamental level: whether exploring language and translation, maps 
and charts, or human/non-human animal interaction, Katchadourian is concerned with 
representing and exploring subjective realities. 
 Katchadourian’s piece Office Semaphore (2006; Figure 2) highlights the idea that 
“no two human Umwelten are the same” (Uexküll, Stroll 50). To create this piece, 
Katchadourian had a Manhattan corporate lawyer arrange objects on his upper story 
office windowsill to communicate messages about his experience of his day through a 
predetermined code; the window was viewable through a telescope mounted in a public 
area far below (Kennedy). Katchadourian writes on her website,  
In Office Semaphore, a [visual signaling] system creates a line of 
communication between an ‘insider’ high up in an office building and an 
‘outsider’ in a public space on the ground. […] Office Semaphore bridges 
across physical space (from ground level to high rise) as well as between 
public and private space (outdoor to indoor). Over time, the phrases will 
register shifts in mood within the office. The objects themselves form a 
portrait of the individual who is communicating from just out of sight. 
Katchadourian’s use of the terms “insider” and “outsider” to refer to the lawyer and 
viewer respectively suggests that the two live in different worlds which shape their 
experiences and views. The piece paradoxically emphasizes the physical and figurative 
                                                 
10
 The German word “Umwelt” translates literally to “environment”, but it has taken on von Uexküll’s 
more specific meaning in the fields of biosemiotics and animal studies.  
10 
distance between the worker and viewer in its attempt to conflate it: normally used for 
looking at unreachable things such as stars, the telescope here implies that the office 
worker is more distant than we normally might think. The crudeness of the code also 
emphasizes the remoteness of the worker to the viewer, questioning how precisely people 
with such (presumably) different Umwelten can ever communicate. 
 
 However, due partly to this crudeness, the semaphore system that the piece sets 
up is incredibly open to interpretation on the viewer’s end, as well as on that of the 
lawyer. Based on the International Maritime Signal Flag system, the phrases to which the 
pictures correspond have a poetic quality to them: “I am drifting,” “I require a tug,” 
“Currently undergoing speed trial,” “Directions received but not understood.”  Because 
they come from a context other than that of an office, the phrases have no definite 
meaning, but must be interpreted based on associations and moods they call up for both 
the office worker and the viewer.  
Figure 2: View of Office Semaphore 
(2006) by Nina Katchadourian 
11 
 The objects used to denote these phrases—a potted plant, a yellow legal pad, a 
small framed desk photo, etc.—do come from an office context, however, and yet it 
becomes clear to viewers that they do not really know what the objects themselves mean 
to the lawyer. For example, viewers might find themselves wondering, “Who is pictured 
in the photo and what do they mean to the lawyer?” “Does the lawyer enjoy or feel 
burdened by caring for the plant?”  “When the lawyer looks at a blank legal pad, is he 
excited? Overwhelmed? Anxious?” In Von Uexküll’s terms, what such viewers are 
wondering about is the “functional tone”: the meaning an object has to a specific person 
(or other animal) at a specific time, which “evolve[s] as a result of repeated personal 
experiences by the subject” (Stroll 67). 
 Another piece that deals with subjective realities is Hand-Held Subway (1996; 
Figure 3). To create this work, Katchadourian dissected a New York City subway map, 
carefully cutting away the background from the subway lines, then crumpled the resulting 
strips of paper in her hand and took a photograph. She says, “Hand-Held Subway is 
absolutely useless as a map, but to me [it] accurately describes the experience of trying to 
deal with a complicated transportation network” (Attention 6). A conventional subway 
map does not correspond well with human experiences of space, so Katchadourian 
modifies one to be more reflective of her own subjective experience.  
 In Natural Car Alarms (2002; Figure 4), Katchadourian modified the alarms of 
three cars to sound like bird calls. The idea for the piece came from an experience where 
she momentarily mistook a bird for a car alarm in the middle of a remote forest. In von 
Uexküll’s terms, Katchadourian experienced confusion of perceptual cues, which are the 
12 
sensations that allow animals to recognize what is present in their environment (9). This 
confusion can result when one’s receptor image—the mental image (or, in this case, 
sound) one uses to make sense of things—is too general for the situation (59). Mended 
Spiderwebs also provides a good illustration of this phenomenon. In this piece (which I 
will discuss later on in greater depth) Katchadourian attempted to “fix” broken 
spiderwebs with red string. While the “repaired” spider webs look enough like intact 
webs to Katchadourian (ostensibly—the piece is rather tongue-in-cheek, after all), to 
spiders they looked even more broken than before, as evidenced by the fact that the 
spiders immediately set to work removing Katchadourian’s repairs. This shows that 
spiders have more specific receptor images of spider webs than humans do, illustrating 
von Uexkull’s point that spiders’ Umwelten are very different from those of humans.  
Figure 3: Hand-held Subway (1996) by 
Nina Katchadourian 
13 
 
Figure 4: View of Natural Car Alarms (2002) by Nina Katchadourian 
Spontaneous Meaning 
 The universe, Jesper Hoffmeyer explains at the beginning of his book Signs of 
Meaning in the Universe, was born from “irregularities” in the radiation that emanated 
from the Big Bang (2). These “irregularities” eventually formed into the lumps of matter 
that make up the universe. Hoffmeyer shows that we have great difficulty in thinking 
about the nothingness that existed before these lumps came into existence. He attributes 
this to the fact that “nothingness” is a mental concept, which thus, by its very existence as 
a concept, has significance to us, even though it represents the absence of significance. 
He writes, “only by being conceived of can nothingness exist” (5). 
 Nina Katchadourian’s piece, Indecision on the Moon (2001), echoes this idea. To 
create the work, Katchadourian edited out most of the recognizable words of the Apollo 
11 moon walk’s audio recording. What is left is dominated by verbalized pauses and 
radio static: 
14 
The…uh…like the uh…of my…uh…this is Houston we’re copying…the 
uh…the uh…the uh…do uh…it’s a…we’re uh…uh…I can see uh…there 
uh…but uh…o.k. we’re ready to uh…duh…uh…duh…and 
uh…the…uh…the uh…uh…and uh…(From Indecision on the Moon, qtd. 
in Rosenberg 33). 
In the installation of the piece, the sound is played back in a darkened room: the spaces 
between words returned to a space reminiscent of the original context in which they were 
uttered: outer space. Thanks to the mysterious, staticky audio and the “gauzy maze” of 
the installation space, Daniel Rosenberg writes, “[e]ntering the piece is like falling off the 
edge of the world” (35). To viewers (or more aptly, given the aural nature of the piece, 
listeners) the verbal tics, originally meaningless in that they are generally unattended 
when in the context of words and in that they were only semi-consciously uttered, take on 
new meaning, and suggest, as the title indicates, a sense of indecision and hesitation. 
Rosenberg observes how, even in the absence of the iconic words of Neil Armstrong, the 
audio is recognizable: 
Indecision on the Moon […] begins with speech fragments: a duel 
between the definite and the indefinite; stabs at possession; broken 
attempts at comparison; ditto, repetition, and echo. But even before the 
first sharp noun pierces this phatic bubble we know exactly what void 
we’re listening to. The static and the staccato are unmistakable: it sounds 
like 1969 and just exactly like the moon. (Rosenberg 35).   
This demonstrates how humans spontaneously interpret, or endow with meaning, 
everything on which we focus our attention, even “a void” of noises never meant to 
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signify anything. As Hoffmeyer writes, “we want there to be lumps in this nothingness 
[emphasis added]” (Signs 4).  
 The piece Talking Popcorn (2001; Figure 5) exemplifies this desire for finding 
meaning even where none might have existed before. On her website, Katchadourian 
describes the piece, which she terms a “sound sculpture”: 
A microphone in the cabinet underneath the popcorn machine picks up 
[the] sound of popping corn, and a laptop hidden in the pedestal runs a 
custom-written program that translates the popping sounds according to 
the patterns and dictates of Morse Code. A computer-generated voice 
provides a simultaneous spoken translation. 
To display the piece, Katchadourian includes text quotes from the popcorn, the two 
kernels, bronzed for preservation, which produced the popcorn’s first word (“we”), and 
daily logs of the popcorn’s speech, along with the operating customized popcorn 
machine.  
 In an interview, Katchadourian discusses Talking Popcorn’s “implied question”: 
“What if everything in the world really meant something? […] It starts to sound like 
crazy person territory: everything is telling you something, all the time” (Attention 17).  
As one might expect, much of the speech the popcorn machine has produced is gibberish 
(for example, “tttayeaeihe hltpwetbcrhg dttet a ki ahei hyvet eqqt i he xvonttpwda” [Qtd. 
in Dillon 70]). However, as Katchadourian points out later in the interview, it has uttered 
“mom” numerous times, it once asked “Do you ski?” and the  longest word it has said is 
“silent” (Attention 18). Like Katchadourian herself, viewers of the piece likely find it 
hard not to read into what Talking Popcorn has said.  
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 Hoffmeyer’s point in discussing nothingness is that meaning—i.e. signification, 
the “counterpoint” to nothingness—can emerge spontaneously from nothing (Signs 5). 
Drawing from Peirce’s theorizations on the origin of natural laws, he shows that nature 
has a “tendency to take habits” but that, to borrow Stuart Kauffman’s term, these habits 
are not “prestateable.” In other words, the habits that did develop are not the only habits 
that could possibly have developed. In contrast to determinism, which is based on “the 
belief that every cause can have only one possible effect,” biosemiotics looks beyond 
mere causality to meaning and relationships (Hoffmeyer, Signs 25). According to von 
Uexküll,  
Meaning is the guiding star that biology must follow. The rule of causality 
is a poor guide: causal relationships deal only with antecedents and 
Figure 5: View of Talking Popcorn (2001) 
by Nina Katchadourian 
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consequences, thereby completely concealing from us broad biological 
interrelationships and interactions11 (Meaning 43). 
Hoffmeyer contends that the meaning generated within these complex “interrelationships 
and interactions” cannot be broken down into deterministic cause and effect because it is 
spontaneous and unpredictable.  
Like [semiotician Charles Sanders] Peirce I prefer a philosophy which 
enables one to comprehend the world as a place where spontaneity is not 
rejected out of hand and where one can therefore entertain the thought that 
something radically new—i.e. essentially unpredictable—might be 
generated (Hoffmeyer, Signs 27). 
As such a philosophy, biosemiotics sees nature’s “tendency to take habits” and, in doing 
so, to create “something radically new,” as central to the evolution of the universe, life, 
and meaning. Life “exemplifies” this tendency, in that life is a sort of “pattern that [can] 
be repeated ad infinitum,” and at the same time relies on nature’s tendency to take habits: 
“[i]n a world where nothing was predictable, Life would be out of a job” (Hoffmeyer, 
Signs 28). Paradoxically, however, when the pattern of life plays out, it is full of 
surprises: everything from genetic mutations and symbiosis to behavioral and semiotic 
innovation. In this way, “the predictability of chemical laws facilitated the establishment 
of unpredictability at a biological level” (Hoffman, Signs 29). In other words, from 
nothingness emerged natural laws, and from natural laws emerged an unpredictable and 
thus creative process: evolution. 
                                                 
11
 While Hoffmeyer, and biosemiotics generally, take this view of biology as relational from von Uexküll, 
it is important to note that von Uexküll appears to have viewed nature as much more static and harmonious 
than contemporary biosemiotic theorists do. Thus, the extent to which von Uexküll himself would agree 
with Hoffmeyer’s ideas about spontaneity and unpredictability remains uncertain. 
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Mistakes and Creativity 
 Hoffmeyer also focuses on the “lumps in nothingness” in order to introduce the 
idea that fallibility is essential to the evolution of the universe, of life, and of meaning. In 
a sense, “the world itself is the most wonderful mistake of all” (Signs 145), since the 
lumps that developed into the universe came about through “irregularities.” Evolution, he 
points out, is a “never-ending sequence of ‘mistakes’ and ‘misunderstandings’ that put all 
life forms into a constant state of flux” (Signs 29). As biologist Lynn Margulis’ work 
shows, without “a failed act of eating” which resulted in symbiogenesis12, life forms 
would not have evolved at all (Wheeler, Figures 102). Hoffmeyer shows that mistakes 
prevent stagnation, and that creativity is intimately intertwined with error. “The tendency 
to make mistakes lies at the root of all true development in this world,” he asserts (Signs 
144). 
 Katchadourian is similarly obsessed with mistakes, misinterpretation, and 
misunderstanding. As poet and art critic Frances Richard puts it, “Katchadourian poses a 
philosophical proposition about the intimate correlation between error and discovery” 
(46). Katchadourian often utilizes mistakes as inspiration in her creative process as well 
as focusing on them in her work. For example, as previously discussed, the idea for 
Natural Car Alarms came about because Katchadourian mistook a bird call for a car 
alarm. Another piece, Grnad Opening Banner (2006), purposely puts a glaring 
typographical error (which Katchadourian originally witnessed on a sign in front of a 
Brooklyn deli) on display on a large banner over the entry of an art museum. In the video 
piece Accent Elimination (2005), Katchadourian showcases “mistakes” in pronunciation 
                                                 
12
 Symbiogenesis: “the formation of new organs and new organisms through symbiotic mergers” (Margulis 
33). 
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inherent in having and attempting to mimic a foreign accent, as well as the 
misunderstandings that arise from them.  
 Like Hoffmeyer, Katchadourian connects mistakes to creativity. In an interview, 
she explains why she is inspired by mistakes in general, and mistranslation in particular, 
in her work: 
I think that there is an incredibly creative act inherent in mistranslation. It 
is a moment when you are expansively and creatively interpreting 
something. It may all end up completely wrong, but there can be an 
immense amount of imagination involved when you don’t completely 
understand something (Attention 19) 
This corresponds very closely to Hoffmeyer’s ideas about mistakes and misinterpretation 
being essential for creativity. Hoffmeyer conceptualizes the act of imagining as the 
purposeful entertainment of false futures, since there are many possible futures, but only 
one future that will actually occur. “Imagination,” he writes “is the creative exploitation 
of error” (Signs 145).  Katchadourian’s piece, Monument to the Unelected (2008; Figure 
6), parallels this idea of false futures while also emphasizing failure. This work consists 
of fifty-six election signs for every losing U.S. presidential candidate in history. As 
Katchadourian writes on her website, “the piece presented a view of the country's 
collective political road not taken.” By confronting viewers with the names of those not 
elected, Katchadourian raises “what if?” questions in viewers’ minds, initiating 
imaginative thinking released from the constraints of reality. 
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 But Katchadourian does not just pay attention to human failures and mistakes. In 
Carla and a Friend (2002; Figure 7), Katchadourian photographed a snake with a rat who 
was meant to be her food with whom she had become friends instead. Von Uexküll 
discusses instances of inappropriate bonding between different species, and while his 
discussion does not explain exactly how the situation between the snake and rat could 
have occurred, it does indicate that an animal’s mood or “functional tone” can change 
how the animal identifies other creatures, even from moment to moment: “it is not the 
perceptual image alone that decides whether one is faced with a jackdaw or non-jackdaw 
[i.e. a friend or foe] but the functional image of the subject’s own attitude” (61). In other 
words, love sometimes results from a semiotic mistake. 
 The unavoidability of mistakes figures heavily in philosopher Mary Midgley’s 
discussion of communication between humans as well as between members of different 
species. In her book Animals and Why They Matter, she rails against the notion that in 
order for a being to warrant moral consideration, that being must be in possession of 
language. She points out that much human communication is non-verbal—probably far 
more than we are conscious of—and that “because speech is often used to conceal or 
Figure 6: View of Monument to 
the Unelected (2008) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
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misrepresent feelings,” animals’ lack of speech not only does not prevent us from 
communicating with them, but “it is often a positive advantage” (54).  
 
Figure 7: Carla and a Friend I (2002) by Nina Katchadourian 
 Much of Katchadourian’s body of work explores the limits of language along 
similar lines. In Please, Please, Pleased to Meet'cha (2006), Katchadourian asked United 
Nations translators to work from descriptions of birdsongs in order to reproduce them. 
None of the translators had ever before heard the particular birdsong they were working 
to mimic, so they were entirely dependent on the written description. In this case, human 
language conveyed with much difficulty (or failed to convey at all, in some cases) what a 
direct experience with the bird in question would have conveyed with ease, even though 
the bird is of another species. 
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 Midgley’s argument that animals deserve our moral consideration rests on the 
idea that, although we cannot know how non-human species experience the world, we 
also cannot really know how humans other than ourselves subjectively experience the 
world. That humans can self-report in a way that animals cannot, since they have no 
complex language (as far as we know), does not change the fact that our understanding of 
other humans is necessarily based on comparison with our own direct experiences, since 
we do not have unmediated access to others’ experiences. And so using our own 
experiences to understand and relate to animals is not misguided; in fact, it is the only 
way we can relate to any other being, human or non-human alike. Katchadourian’s piece 
Office Semaphore drives this point home: by providing the anonymous lawyer a very 
simplified code to communicate with passersby, Katchadourian calls attention to how we 
must draw on our own experiences in order to interpret other people’s statements, 
whether they are in rudimentary semaphore or richer verbal language. 
 Midgley does not deny that interpreting other beings’ behavior through the lens of 
our own internal experiences is sometimes inaccurate. But she shows that this is not 
limited to our attempts to understand animals: we make many mistakes when attempting 
to understand other humans as well.  
“Within human life, someone who makes a friend from an age group or 
culture not his own will have no choice but to use materials from his own 
previous experience as a guide to understanding him. As the friendship 
grows, he will repeatedly see the mistakes which he has made by doing 
this badly [and will presumably learn from these mistakes]” (Midgley 
127). 
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Katchadourian’s obsession with mistakes and mistranslations can seem cynical at times, 
but she focuses on errors because they are often learning experiences that present 
opportunities for further creativity. As Midgley suggests, mistakes might very well be 
necessary for the process of developing understanding; behaviorism shoots itself in the 
foot attempting to avoid all mistakes of interpretation by simply removing internal 
experience as a realm of consideration.   
Openness and Attentiveness 
 Similarly, Wendy Wheeler maintains that, although accepted scientific discourse 
pretends that the scientific method is purely and uniquely linear, rational, and objective, 
“science, religion, and art (broadly conceived) are not fundamentally different activities” 
in that they all require intuition, creativity, and openness (Creature 33).  She writes, 
The more we give ourselves over to an apparent serendipity, the closer 
(paradoxically, according to modern theories of knowledge) we come to 
real discovery. There is, thus, an apparent (and real) randomness to 
research and creativity, but, as Polanyi argues, randomness is a feature of 
emergence (Creature 90). 
Hunches or intimations derive from what Wheeler refers to as “tacit knowledge [which] 
is creaturely skillful phenomenological knowledge” (Creature 47). Tacit knowledge 
encompasses what we know through bodily and emotional experience, but what we are 
unable to express fully in words or to explain why we know it. Rather than indicating that 
tacit knowledge is not legitimate, this subconscious quality of tacit knowledge is, 
paradoxically, its strength: it is by “dis-attending from the particulars [that we are able] to 
[…] focus on the gestalt whole” (Creature 90). 
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 Katchadourian herself readily acknowledges the randomness and happenstance 
inherent in her own artistic process. Echoing Wheeler’s ideas, she states that, first and 
foremost, her “job [as an artist] is to pay attention, and to do that with focus and a kind of 
looseness at the same time” (Attention 24).  This process contrasts markedly with that of 
what art critic Jan Verwoert calls “strategic” conceptual art, in which 
there is this commonly held assumption that before you do anything you 
should work out in advance what the rules, legitimations, and references 
are, so that before you even embark on something, you already feel 
obliged to provide an entire system of references and legitimations. 
Rather than attempting to legitimate her work by claiming to always have a plan or a 
goal, as many contemporary artists who work in more strategic ways do,13 Katchadourian 
emphasizes (even plays up, in some cases14) the openness to chance and naïveté that 
often characterizes her mental state at the inception of her projects.  
I don’t necessarily do research before I stumble onto something […] 
Research happens as I develop a new project, but doesn’t necessarily 
inspire it. If I get too involved in the research phase before I start 
something it bogs me down. I am careful to keep a certain balance because 
it can make it nearly impossible to begin anything.  I do believe that there 
is something to be said for having a slightly naïve mind-set going into 
something because you think a little more expansively and you have the 
capability to make a few mistakes that could end up being interesting. I 
                                                 
13
 or, perhaps, are forced to do by the economic and logistical realities of the art world 
 
14
 For example, Katchadourian website’s descriptions of Moss Maps (1992), Songs of the Islands (1996/8), 
Artificial Insemination (1998), and Barnacle Mixer (2002)  all follow a similar trajectory: the artist notices 
something, decides to intervene somehow, and the artwork spontaneously takes form. 
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don’t want to know everything at the outset. I want to risk figuring it out 
wrong. (Katchadourian, Attention 22).  
The openness with which Katchadourian approaches her projects aligns with what Stuart 
Kauffman calls “precisely the biosemiotic point of view”:  
Life is a continuous knowing of the world, […] a continuous meaningful 
exploration of meaningful relationship. […] No laws whatsoever entail15 
the becoming of the biosphere[…] Physics and the physics worldview 
reach an end at the evolution of life. The universe may be described by 
entailing laws, but life is not. […] The biosphere is creating its own 
possibilities of future becoming (Kauffman). 
 He argues that, since it is impossible to prestate all the possibilities in a given situation, 
strategic thought is inadequate: “If we do not know what can happen, then reason is an 
insufficient guide for living our lives.” Because life is fundamentally relational, other 
ways of knowing and understanding, including intuition and metaphor, are necessary to 
navigate it. 
 In a sense, then, Katchadourian’s approach to making art is deliberately free from 
entailment. She structures her art-making process in a way that keeps it radically open to 
mistakes, chance, and possibility. Her ongoing series, Seat Assignment (which began in 
2010), is a good example of how Katchadourian’s projects are often both created out of 
and sustained by this openness.  
 Katchadourian creates the photos and videos that constitute Seat Assignment 
entirely while in transit using only materials she would normally have access to on a 
commercial flight, including in-flight magazines, snacks, lavatory paper products, and 
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 to entail: to involve as a necessary or inevitable part or consequence 
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whatever articles of clothing she happens to be wearing. Within this strict set of 
limitations, Katchadourian challenges herself to remain alert to the possibilities that the 
prosaic objects around her present as art materials. She says of Seat Assignment, 
I’m very interested in situations where there are limits and boundaries to 
what’s possible and how you find your way around those obstacles, how 
you think on your feet. How you make something out of nothing … much 
of my subject matter comes from the mundane everyday. I’m always 
trying to look at the things we are overlooking and underestimating in 
terms of their interest or value. At the same time, I have a practice where 
often my life and my activities and all those things kind of cross over into 
my art-making. So this project brings all those things together. It’s a way 
of integrating art-making into part of the professional necessity in my life 
to travel and it’s a way to try to test my premise that there really is 
something to be found no matter where you look if you look in a certain 
way (Listener). 
This certain way of looking involves a suspension of preexisting ideas of what subject 
matter and materials make for interesting or valuable art, and a radical attentiveness to 
and open engagement with the materials and situations at hand, while at the same time 
allowing for the “looseness” or “dis-attend[ance] from particulars” that enables what 
Richard terms the “parasympathetic16” (45) nature of Katchadourian’s work to emerge. 
Katchadourian’s description of the conception of Lavatory Portraits in the Flemish Style 
                                                 
16
 “Parasympathetic: productive and relaxed; existing alongside togetherness, or at the same time as a faulty 
close relation” (Richard 45). 
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(2010 and ongoing; Figure 8), one series within Seat Assignment, exemplifies this way of 
working. 
The very first of the Flemish lavatory portraits started on a flight a few 
months back. I did that one really quickly. It was completely spontaneous. 
It’s interesting, I have been looking at the pictures from this entire past 
year [for the exhibition Seat Assignment], and I can see that on a few 
flights previous to the first Flemish portrait I had gone in there and put one 
of those tissue seat covers on my head as a hat. I think a few flights later I 
tried it again in a different position and then I suddenly thought, “Oh, it 
kind of looks like one of those Flemish head coverings.” And it kind of 
clicked into place (Listener). 
This description of the unattended-to development of Katchadourian’s idea, and the 
spontaneity with which it finally dawned on her what the tissue on her head resembled 
follows the pattern of discovery based on tacit knowledge that Wheeler describes. 
 
Figure 8: Images from Lavatory Self Portraits in the Flemish Style (2010 and ongoing) by 
Nina Katchadourian 
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Play and Imitation: Encountering the Other 
 Process open to the other (which we also call creativity) is the 
signature of life, evolution and change […] When we are being creative, 
whether in the arts or the sciences, what we seem to be alert to are the 
message-rich intelligences of our Umwelt which are participative, and 
which spring from a deep immersion of self in the otherness of our world 
(Wheeler, Creature 133-4).   
In a sense, the openness and attentiveness which characterize Katchadourian’s approach 
to art-making are fundamentally an approach to otherness. Biosemiotically speaking, “the 
difficult but creative encounter between similarity and difference” undergirds “the 
patterns of life” itself (Wheeler, Creature 133). 
On this increasingly widely accepted view of evolutionary biology, the 
motor of evolution is, thus, the encounter of identity with an otherness 
which is, nonetheless, sufficiently semiotically recognizable to allow of a 
productive encounter and negotiation, expanding a semiotic Umwelt, out 
of which new strata of life can emerge (Wheeler, Creature 133). 
One major way in which Katchadourian negotiates this “encounter of identity with an 
otherness” is through play. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “play” as “[e]xercise 
or activity engaged in for enjoyment or recreation rather than for a serious or practical 
purpose; amusement, entertainment, diversion.” This lack of a “practical purpose” 
corresponds to the open-endedness or lack of entailment which characterizes the 
encounter with otherness: otherness is by definition at least somewhat unknown and thus 
unpredictable prior to meeting and engaging in play together. Midgley links this lack of 
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“practical purpose” to art: without this “tendency to play of all sorts, including such 
things as imitating, singing, dancing and the making of objects for pleasure” there would 
be no art (119). These, she says, are “habits on which the arts are based” (119). 
 Midgley writes that play in other species is a sign of intelligence (119), and that, 
along with dreams, the presence of play is evidence that animals are conscious beings 
(141). Furthermore, since “play signals penetrate species barriers with perfect ease” 
(117), play is a way in which different species can communicate with each other. 
Katchadourian’s piece Natural Car Alarms (discussed briefly earlier) alludes to 
commonalities among birds and humans, including the desire to play with sound,17 to 
imitate others, and even to create for aesthetic pleasure. As Katchadourian suggests, the 
piece interrogates “what we mean when we use the word ‘natural’” (qtd. in Karr). As 
Chapter III of this thesis will discuss in greater detail, what is considered “natural” is 
generally assumed in Western thought to preclude what is considered “cultural”. Of 
course, in this line of thought, animals fall into the former category whereas humans fall 
into the latter, implying that only humans are capable of creating and appreciating art.  
 However, both non-human animals and humans are widely recognized as being 
capable of play—young animals play just as human children do.18 Katchadourian’s art-
making, based largely on play, serves to blur the boundaries between the natural and the 
cultural, and the human and the non-human animal.  Drawing on Darwin and Deleuze, 
Elizabeth Grosz theorizes that art arises in the natural world from the enjoyment and 
amusement—that is to say, the playfulness—inherent in sexual selection. She writes, 
                                                 
17
 Perhaps tellingly, “play” can also mean “Of a male bird: to strut, dance, or engage in other forms of 
sexual display.”  
 
18
 The O.E.D. points out that the verb “play” is “Now chiefly used of children or young animals.” 
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“The haunting beauty of birdsong, the provocative performance of erotic displays in 
primates, the attraction of insects to the perfume of plants are all in excess of mere 
survival” (7).  By playfully turning the aesthetically-pleasing art of an animal into an item 
useful to humans in Natural Car Alarms, Katchadourian subverts the narrative of human 
exceptionalism in the realm of artistic production. Although (or perhaps because) 
Katchadourian did not learn of it until after creating the piece, the fact that at least one 
species of bird, the Lyrebird, has learned to imitate car alarms (as well as chain saws and 
camera shutters) allows for this reading of Natural Car Alarms to come full circle, 
underscoring further the animal agency present in play and art-making.  
 Grosz writes, “The becoming-other that seduction entails [is…] a fundamentally 
dynamic, awkward, mal-adaptation that enables the production of the frivolous, the 
unnecessary, the pleasing, the sensory for their own sake.” (Grosz 7). Katchadourian’s 
short video Mystic Shark (2007; Figure 9) exemplifies the awkwardness and dynamism of 
“becoming-other.” In the video, she attempts to insert six souvenir petrified shark teeth 
into her mouth and then hold them in place. Her website’s explanation for the enigmatic 
piece does nothing to dispel potential viewer confusion, suggesting simply that viewers 
imagine her portraying a “tough guy shark” getting ready to do his job of scaring people. 
The video exemplifies what Steve Baker, in his essay “Sloughing the Human,” describes 
as “a halfhearted and haphazard affair” (158) typical of imitations of animals in 
contemporary art. Even with the teeth in her mouth, Katchadourian in no way resembles a 
shark, nor does she attempt to look fierce; instead, the way she looks wide-eyed at the 
camera and smirks with the teeth protruding from her mouth suggests an imp of some 
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sort. However, the teeth’s suggestion of sharkness is all that is needed: “‘imitation’ of an 
animal can be just that easy and approximate,” Baker writes (158). 
In all of these instances [of animal imitation in art], it might be said that 
the thing imitated or gestured toward is not so much an animal as a version 
of the imitator or gesturer—“l’animal que donc je suis,” as Derrida has it. 
In a postmodern age marked by “a deeply felt loss of faith in our ability to 
represent the real,” this is perhaps how the animal is now most 
productively and imaginatively thought in art—as a thing actively to be 
performed, rather than passively represented (Baker 159). 
In Mystic Shark, the two immobile wooden tern statues on the window ledge behind the 
artist provide a marked contrast to both Katchadourian’s lively shark and to the sea bird 
cries that are audible in the background. Katchadourian’s performance is not at all a 
Figure 9: Still from Mystic Shark (2007) by Nina Katchadourian 
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convincing representation of a shark, yet its playfulness affords sharks a sense of agency 
that the more representative statues deny to terns. Paradoxically, in failing to 
convincingly represent a shark, Katchadourian succeeds in calling into question the strict 
boundaries between humans and sharks while still maintaining their differences.  
 Katchadourian’s Mended Spiderwebs series (1998), which will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter III, can be read as another such attempt to blur the boundaries 
between humans and animals: by “repairing” the spider webs, Katchadourian is, in a 
sense, playing at being a spider. But she goes beyond actively performing as a spider—
she records the spiders’ responses, allowing them agency as well. 
 In both Mystic Shark and Mended Spiderwebs, Katchadourian’s imitations of 
animals simultaneously call into question and reinforce the divide between humans and 
non-human animals. On one hand, it is impressive that, as a human, Katchadourian can 
repair spider webs without destroying them; on the other, her repairs are clearly 
insufficient in the spiders’ eyes. While Katchadourian writes on her website that Mystic 
Shark “tries to elicit sympathy through the awkward and sentimental anthropomorphism 
of this much-feared and almost mythically vicious creature,” the video is hardly 
convincing of either her ability to imitate a shark or of why exactly we should extend our 
sympathies to sharks.  
These imitations [in contemporary art] generally act out the instability 
rather than the fixity of the thing nominally initiated. They suggest playful 
exchanges between the human and the animal, or between one animal and 
another, which may allude to borders and distinctions, but which are not 
impeded by them (Baker 158). 
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This simultaneous allusion to and working through of difference is even more 
pronounced in another of Katchadourian’s pieces, Animal Crossdressing (2002; Figure 
10), in which she dresses a snake as a rat and vice versa. Again, the costumes are 
obviously hand-made and unconvincing (although clearly much more work went into 
making them than went into acquiring the shark teeth in Mystic Shark.) However, where 
Mystic Shark seems enigmatic, Animal Crossdressing abounds in possible, but potentially 
contradictory, interpretations. Artist and writer Jordan Essoe connects the imitation 
occurring in Animal Crossdressing to the natural world. 
 Both types of mimicry [prey-mimicking-predator and predator-
mimicking-prey] occur in nature, such as the Caligo butterfly, whose wing 
design imitates the eyes of an owl, or certain types of spiders who smell, 
move, and look like ants in order to invade nests and eat their babies.  
Katchadourian’s snake, however, entertainingly fails to appear 
legitimately vulnerable at all, due to the sheer size of the rat costume that 
it must assume. 
Seen in light of the abundance of examples of animal mimicry in the natural world, this 
piece documents an attempt to mimic nature’s mimicry. Although the awkwardness of 
the literal cross-dressing process emphasizes the “borders and distinctions” between the 
two animals (as well as how problematic it is for Katchadourian to be using them this 
way,19) in the end, unexpected transformations do occur. While Essoe sees the 
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 The snake is less resistant than the rat, but neither of them look like they are enjoying being a part of 
piece’s creation. On her website, Katchadourian writes, “I handled the animals together with the pets’ 
owners, and although the video emphasizes the awkwardness of dressing the animals, rest assured that 
neither snake nor rat were harmed during the making of this project.” 
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transformation of the snake into a rat as “entertainingly fail[ed]” due to issues of scale, 
Katchadourian observes on her website, 
It wasn't until I saw the video footage [of Animal Crossdressing] that I 
realized how many transformations had come into play: the snake's body, 
lying inside the unzipped rat suit, looked like the intenstines [sic] of a 
giant rat. The predatory snake was suddenly both the prey and the guts 
ingesting the prey, all visible inside a huge gutted rodent that looked like it 
had just turned the tables on a snake and swallowed it whole. 
The unconvincing nature of the huge rat costume, which Essoe focuses on, allows the 
snake to be read as predator, on the one hand. But on the other hand, as Katchadourian 
points out, the snake can also be read as both having been swallowed by the rat, and as 
the rat’s intestines. By simultaneously occupying the roles of predator and prey in Animal 
Crossdressing, the boundaries between the snake and the rat are not erased so much as 
rendered permeable.  
 
Figure 10: Crossdressed Rat and Crossdressed Snake from Animal Crossdressing (2002) 
by Nina Katchadourian 
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Trans-corporeality 
Attention to Materiality 
 Trans-corporeality reconceptualizes the boundaries between self and other as 
permeable: present and important, but not absolute. There is thus a paradox embedded in 
trans-corporeal views of difference: “Val Plumwood has insisted that an ethical human 
relation to the nonhuman world demands that we ‘recognize both the otherness of nature’ 
as well as ‘its continuity with the human self’” (Alaimo, Bodily 42). In its quest to 
articulate such a relation, trans-corporeality takes as its starting point a renewed attention 
to materiality. 
While it is still crucial to analyze and critique how “nature” and the 
“environment” circulate as potent discursive formulations, many of us 
would like to find ways to complement and complicate that sort of 
analysis with investigations that account for the ways in which nature, the 
environment, and the material world itself signify, act upon, or otherwise 
affect human bodies, knowledges, and practices. Notwithstanding the fact 
that theories of social construction have performed invaluable work by 
critiquing the naturalized and oppressive categories of race, class, gender, 
sexuality, and ability, from an environmentalist perspective, such theories 
may bracket or minimize the significance, substance, and power of the 
material world. (Alaimo, Bodily 7-8). 
As sculptor Jackie Brookner pointed out in 1992, there is an irony in postmodernism’s 
myopic focus on discourse in a time when Western society “has been insistently placing 
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its own existence, as well as that of the rest of life on Earth, in dire jeopardy, poisoning 
water, land, and air” (8). Perhaps anticipating trans-corporeality, Brookner wrote 
The heart of the problem lies in our relation to both matter and ourselves. 
In setting ourselves up over and against matter, apart from it (Cartesian 
subject-object dualism), and in assuming control over nature, we have 
become deeply alienated from our own nature. Matter has become mere 
matter, something for us to use or, better yet, possess. In frantic glut we 
have lost our senses, and in fury have dissociated from our bodies. The 
great irony of our materialism is how little matter really matters to us (8). 
Brookner contended that art “can be instrumental in the process of revisioning ourselves 
and our ways of living” due to its ability to create bodily, unconscious, and conscious 
experiences. She viewed the attention that contemporary artists at the time were paying to 
materiality—especially particular materialities, such as waste, that Western society tends 
to disregard—as attempts “to acknowledge our own vulnerability and limitations […and ] 
to find new ways of seeing ourselves and our identity with Earth” (Brookner 11). 
 While Nina Katchadourian doesn’t focus on waste in her body of work as a 
whole, a few of her pieces—Songs of the Island (1996/1998), Surface Spoils (1997), and 
The Recovery Channels (2005; Figure 11), do make use of urban debris in their emphasis 
on materiality. As she details on her website, to create these pieces she collected video 
and audio tape found “tangled in gutters, subway grills and traffic islands” and “hanging 
in ribbons from trees, wrapped around lampposts, around fire escapes […] etc.” in New 
York City (Songs of the Island and The Recovery Channels) and various European cities 
(Surface Spoils). For the video piece The Recovery Channels, after the tape was digitized,  
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each fragment was played back on a different channel of a video monitor which viewers 
could control with a remote; for the audio piece Surface Spoils, Katchadourian created an 
“interactive wall installation [in which e]ach original piece of loose tape is displayed 
under a plastic dome.” 
 These pieces are notable from a 
trans-corporeal point of view in that insist 
on the lasting materiality of  what is “cast 
off, unwanted, or perhaps shamefully 
thrown away” in Western civilization 
despite the fact that they are primarily 
sound and audio, and thus ephemeral, 
pieces (Katchadourian). While viewers 
listen to the “stylistic variety and linguistic diversity” of Songs of the Island, for instance, 
the accompanying photo of a left  hand (presumably the artist’s; Figure 12) holding a ball 
of tangled cassette tape serves as a reminder of the material impacts of “the astounding 
mix of people living in New York” (Katchadourian). Similarly, the inclusion of each 
piece of loose audio tape in the display of Surface Spoils gives the sounds a physical 
presence. 
 This insistence on the materiality of audio and video art has parallels in many of 
Katchadourian’s map pieces. As Katchadourian points out on her website, the photograph 
entitled Handheld Subway (discussed earlier), “was made at the same time as [she] was 
collecting a lot of loose audio tape found on the streets of New York” for Songs of the 
Islands. Visually, the two pieces display a striking similarity: Handheld Subway, like the 
Figure 11: Still from The Recovery 
Channels (2005) by Nina Katchadourian 
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image displayed with Songs of the Island, depicts a left hand holding a ball of material. 
Rather than the cassette tape of the latter piece, however, in the former it is a “dissected” 
subway map that lies crumpled in what is again presumably the artist’s hand. 
Katchadourian states that Handheld Subway “renders the subway network into something 
that looks like just another piece of tangled trash on the ground.” It is important to note, 
however, that it is not the subway network itself that is likened to material waste in the 
piece, but its representation.  
 In Map Dissection II (1991), 
Katchadourian cut out intersections of 
major highways from US road map and 
placed them between microscope slides. 
She returned to this idea in 2000 when she 
created Finland’s Longest Road by cutting 
out the representation of highway E75 
from a paper map and placing it in a petri 
dish. In these pieces she reminds viewers 
that images and representations are 
material objects to be studied, and that there are material implications inherent in what 
representations show and in what they leave out.  
Material Agencies: Thing-power and Creativity 
 In her three cassette tape pieces, Katchadourian allows the found video and audio 
tapes to, in some sense, have agency in the finished product: in Surface Spoils, for 
instance, she writes that she deliberately chose not to edit the tapes: she didn’t alter the 
Figure 12: Image displayed with Songs of 
the Islands (1996/1998) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
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length of the tape fragments and she kept them in the order in which they were found. 
The act itself of finding and collecting these discarded objects also highlights what Jane 
Bennett terms their “thing-power,” which is often forgotten in Western materialist 
culture. She observes 
American materialism, which requires ever-increasing numbers of 
products purchased in ever-shorter cycles, is antimateriality. The sheer 
volume of commodities, and the hyperconsumptive necessity of junking 
them to make room for new ones, conceals the vitality of matter (5). 
But, as Katchadourian’s pieces suggest, that which is “cast off, unwanted, or perhaps 
shamefully thrown away,” as she writes on her website, doesn’t just disappear. “[A] vital 
materiality can never really be thrown ‘away,’ for it continues its activities even as a 
discarded or unwanted commodity” (Bennett 6).  
 The roughed-up look of the video footage in The Recovery Channels is more 
evidence of thing-power, caused as it presumably was by the wind blowing the cassette 
tape fragments around, causing them to rub up against other objects and get scratched, 
folded, and torn in unpredictable ways. This thing-power corresponds with what Alaimo 
calls “agency without agents”, which she defines as “a foundational, perpetual becoming 
that happens without will or intention or delineation” (Bodily 145).  
 Katchadourian’s piece Talking Popcorn (which was discussed in relation to 
biosemiotics above) exemplifies thing-power or agency without agents: while each piece 
of popcorn pops as predicted, it does so in a unique way and at an unpredictable time. 
The bronzed pieces of popcorn that comprise Talking Popcorn's First Words (2001) draw 
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attention to the uniqueness of each piece of popcorn. Artist and philosopher Manuel de 
Landa writes 
[F]orms of spontaneous structural generation suggest that inorganic matter 
is much more variable and creative than we ever imagined. And this 
insight into matter’s inherent creativity needs to be fully incorporated into 
our new materialist philosophies (qtd. in Bennett 7). 
The fact that each piece of popcorn’s shape is slightly different, and that the timing of the 
pops, “translated” through Morse code, creates unique utterances underscores the 
creativity of the materials which make up the popcorn. 
 This agentless creativity also shows up in Katchadourian’s piece The Nightgown 
Pictures (1996-2004). In this piece, Katchadourian attempted to find and photograph the 
locations of a series of photos that her grandmother took of her mother, Stina, wearing a 
handmade nightgown each year as her mother was growing up. Most of the original 
photos were taken on Pörtö (a small group of islands east of Helsinki) where 
Katchadourian’s family has spent summers since her mother was little; one (or possibly 
two) photos were taken in the family’s backyard in Helsinki; one was taken near the 
Finnish town of Ylitornio during the year the family was displaced by World War II. 
Katchadourian’s piece includes reprints of the original black-and-white photographs of 
Stina framed side-by-side with the photos Katchadourian took (with the assistance of her 
mother) of the same locations roughly fifty years later, with captions written by the artist. 
These frames are bookended by a frame containing two scrapbook pages—one made by 
Katchadourian’s grandmother and the other by Katchadourian— (Figure 13) and another 
frame containing a lone photo of Katchadourian herself at age one wearing the nightgown 
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in her family’s backyard in Stanford, California. Nearby hangs a larger frame containing 
a full-scale photo of the nightgown itself, stained with age. 
 
Figure 13: Scrapbook pages from The Nightgown Pictures (1996-2004) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
 The series subtly demonstrates the agency of the natural world, and of matter 
itself. Although in the description on Katchadourian’s scrapbook cover, the agency of 
humans is emphasized (“houses had disappeared, rocks had been moved, windows had 
been covered by walls”) the overgrown bushes, the unrecognizable landscapes, the 
transformation of Katchadourian’s mother from a toddler into a teenager, and the stains 
on the nightgown complicate that story.  
 In her captions, Katchadourian records the difficulties she and her mother had 
figuring out where, exactly, the original photos were taken. For example, of the 
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1948/1998 photograph pair, she writes, “[t]he rock cluster in the foreground is barely 
visible anymore, but my mother remembered where it used to be. We thought we could 
detect its contours underneath all the overgrowth”; of the 1942/1999 pair (Figure 14), 
after being unable to identify the correct retake spot with certainty, she writes, “[w]e took 
a guess” (Katchadourian). Even without Katchadourian’s captions to guide the viewer’s 
reading, it is clear in all of the photographs that the landscape has changed since the 
original images were taken: due to the major changes in the vegetation, it takes close 
examination of small landmarks (if they are even present in the photos) such as rocks and 
islands in the distance to verify that they are indeed of the same place.  
 
Figure 14: 1942/1999 pair from The Nightgown Pictures (1996-2004) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
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 The landscape is not the only entity that changes throughout the series, however: 
Stina grows up, eventually becoming too big to wear the nightgown at all. While this 
seems obvious—of course children grow up—considered in relation to the changing 
landscape, Stina’s own transformation positions her as a trans-corporeal subject around 
and in whose very body material agency is at work. In a discussion of feminist 
philosopher Lorraine Code’s work, Alaimo makes a point of distinction between 
ecological thinking, in which humans are recognized as occupying a place in the web of 
life,  and trans-corporeality, which “redefines the human as material” (Alaimo, “Naked” 
1):  
Trans-corporeality, as it insists that the human is never an isolated unit, 
has affinities with the “ecological thinking” that Code describes. 
Furthermore, Code, drawing on Barad’s theory, argues that ecological 
thinking “is capable of seeing nature and human nature as reciprocally 
engaged, intra-active.” The knowing ecological subject that Code 
describes is “materially situated.” The trans-corporeal subject, however, is 
not so much situated, which suggests stability and coherence, but rather 
caught up in and transformed by myriad, often unpredictable material 
agencies (Alaimo Bodily 146) 
Stina’s bare feet and limbs, which protrude from the nightgown more and more each 
year, until the last year of the series (Figure 15) in which she simply holds the too-small 
nightgown up in front of her (seemingly naked) body, emphasize her vulnerability to the 
“myriad material agencies” in which she is “caught up.”  
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Figure 15: 1951/2003 pair from The Nightgown Pictures (1996-2004) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
 In an article on naked environmental protest, Alaimo theorizes the display of nude 
bodies in specific places as a demonstration of political dissent. She writes, “the naked 
protests considered here extend human corporeality into actual places, enacting 
nakedness as an ethical performance of vulnerability—the allied, mutual vulnerabilities 
of human/animal/environment” (Naked 18). While Stina is, of course, neither protesting 
nor nude in The Nightgown Pictures, the thin summery nightgown and her lack of shoes 
do give a sense of exposure to and continuity with the elements, especially in the images, 
in which her toes grip the rock she is standing on (such as 1944) or in which her tan feet 
blend in with the grass (such as 1947). The juxtaposition of the original images with the 
new images adds to this sense of vulnerability, as Stina appears to have vanished into the 
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landscape. In fact, in the last pair of images in the series, Stina seems to have morphed 
into a tree angled in the direction of her long-ago gaze. Fittingly, Katchadourian writes of 
the 2003 image, “Of all the pictures, this one feels like the closest match.”  
 That the family returns to Pörtö every summer (except when they are prevented 
from returning by the war) and enacts this photographic ritual implies that the islands are 
quite literally part of Stina’s, and later, Katchadourian’s development, emotionally but 
also physically. As they breathe, drink and eat, Pörtö’s air, water, and perhaps even its 
soil become part of Stina and Nina’s very bodies. Any toxins it harbors have also most 
likely become part of them. Alaimo locates human vulnerability in this literal union of 
place and body—this trans-corporeality. 
 Humans are vulnerable because they are not in fact “human” in some 
transcendent, contained sense, but are flesh, substance, matter; we are 
permeable and in fact, require the continual input of other forms of 
matter—air, water, food. […The human body] is embedded within and 
inseparable from the “environment” that it ingests. (Alaimo, Naked 24). 
Limits of Language and Representation 
 This inseparability of the human body from nature does not, however, constitute 
some sort of limitless transcendental oneness with nature, as both Alaimo’s and 
Katchadourian’s work shows. Alaimo writes, 
Even as we attempt to formulate new understandings that do not isolate 
the human from the flesh or from nonhuman nature, we need to mark the 
limits of our own ability to render the material world with language. Such 
a sense of limits does not pose nature as exterior to human language, but 
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instead acts to ensure awareness that the process of meaning making is an 
ongoing one, a process that includes nonhuman nature as a participant 
rather than as an object of inquiry (Bodily 42). 
Katchadourian problematizes the representation of nature through language throughout 
her body of work. In her essay on Katchadourian’s work, Frances Richard writes “[the 
artist’s projects] read the book of nature upside down” (46). Richard continues, 
Th[e] taxonomical noise [in Katchadourian’s work] through which we 
strain to hear becomes a perceptual mirror, reflecting back our longing for 
pure transmission. […] Katchadourian translates, through her studio 
interventions, the thrums, squeaks, stains and blotches made by matter’s 
movement against itself. In this endlessly recombinant ecology […] 
[r]emixed code-switching concretizes evanescent thought, transmitting a 
record that is not authentic, but not ersatz either. The blips that we receive 
betray their origins as indexical traces of physics and biology, which have 
passed through the apparatus of language, been deconstructed into babble, 
and reconstituted in a frame that promises attention to each nuance—i.e., 
art (Richard 50). 
Quit Using Us (2002; Figure 16) renders suspect the use of language to represent the 
natural world. To create the piece, “with some difficulty,” Katchadourian spelled out the 
title of the piece with live caterpillars on a reddish-orange background, photographed the 
result, and then printed it at an oversize scale, “reminiscent of a political banner” 
(Katchadourian). That the caterpillars were not entirely compliant with Katchadourian’s 
intentions is clearly shown in the photograph: the “letters” are misshapen because their 
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constituent parts are in the process of crawling away. The obvious irony of 
Katchadourian molding the caterpillars against their will into words that supposedly 
represent their wishes is so simple that it is profound: the imposition of language onto the 
natural world without “an awareness that the process of meaning making is an ongoing 
one […] that includes nonhuman nature as a participant” is fraught. 
 
Figure 16: Quit Using Us (2002) by Nina Katchadourian 
 The video piece GIFT/GIFT (1998; Figure 17) invites a similar interpretation. In 
this work, Katchadourian literally imposes the word “GIFT” (spelled out in red thread) 
onto a spider’s web using tweezers. On her website, she describes what happens: 
[The] particularly aggressive spider battles [the] pair of persistent tweezers 
for control of the web. The tweezers manage, with great difficulty and 
damage to the web, to insert the letters. The spider returns, picks out the 
letters in order, and makes a few repairs before settling back into the web. 
Katchadourian was inspired to do this piece when she learned from a Swedish children’s 
book that spiders sometimes gift dead prey wrapped in thread to other spiders. 
Katchadourian points out that in Swedish20 the word “gift” means “poison”; fittingly for 
her piece, it also means “venom” in the zoological as well as the figurative sense.21  
                                                 
20
 which Katchadourian spoke with her mother and grandmother while growing up. While her maternal 
family is from Finland, they are part of the Swedish-speaking minority. 
 
21
 The modern English “gift” is actually related etymologically to the Swedish “gift”: they both come from 
the Old Germanic root “ge” meaning “to give.” In Old English, “gift” had a narrower sense, meaning 
“payment for a bride,” or, in the plural, “weddings.” Similarly, in modern Swedish, in addition to meaning 
“poison” and “venom,” “gift” also means “to marry,” “married” and “spousal.” 
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Figure 17: Still from GIFT/GIFT (1998) by Nina Katchadourian 
 Katchadourian says of GIFT/GIFT, “[t]he experience of making that video was 
incredible because I had done my part […] and then I just watched as the spider did its 
part. I was just a spectator at that point” (Attention 12). By actively participating in the 
creation of the video, the spider contributes to the meaning-making process that the video 
documents. The word that Katchadourian imposes on the spider is at once open to 
interpretation (given its multiple meanings in different languages) and limiting, in that 
even a human understanding of the multiple senses of “gift” does not totally encompass 
the spider’s interpretation of the (material representation of) the word. Catriona 
Sandilands cautions that, while “new”22 metaphors for humans’ relationships with nature 
are necessary, “there needs to be a point in an ethical relationship at which the ill fit [of 
                                                 
22
 While Sandilands calls for “new” metaphoric relationships, I think it’s important to think about who 
these relationships would be new to. Certainly to people familiar solely with Western industrial culture, but 
most likely not to those who belong to indigenous cultures. 
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metaphors] is explicitly recognized, preventing metaphoric closure and opening the need 
for ongoing conversation” (qtd. in Alaimo 42-43). 
 In a very different way, Translation Exercise (1993; Figure 18) also comments on 
the limits of language in describing the natural world. To create this piece, Katchadourian 
selected a small rock from her parent’s garden in California. Then, she writes on her 
website, while traveling among the various islands of the Finnish Archipelago (which 
includes the island of Pörtö), “I searched for a rock that resembled the one I had and 
switched them, taking the new rock with me and leaving the old one behind. This task 
was repeated on each of the subsequent islands I went to.”  
 While Translation Exercise involved the translation23  of rocks, not words, the 
project alludes to language in many ways, including in the use of the word “translation” 
in the title, and in Katchadourian’s website’s description of the piece: “The last rock sits 
on a shelf, like the period at the end of a sentence.” The fact that Katchadourian chose to 
do the project in the Finnish Archipelago, starting with a rock from her parent’s home in 
California is also significant linguistically, for the two places both involve translation, 
given that Katchadourian grew up bilingual in California, and that Finland has two 
official languages.  
                                                 
23
 Interestingly, while the word “translation” is often used in the context of languages, it comes from the 
Latin word “lātum” which is an irregular form of the Latin verb “ferō,” meaning to bear , to carry, or to 
bring. In an etymological sense, then, to translate is to transfer, or to carry across, which is exactly what 
Katchadourian does with the rocks in Translation Exercise. 
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 Of the project’s design, Katchadourian writes on her 
website, “The idea of what constituted ‘resemblance’ [between 
the rocks] was left quite open (color, temperature, shape, 
texture?)”. She also acknowledges that the act of switching 
rocks was sometimes hurried or perfunctory due to 
“circumstantial factors.” Although the last rock purportedly 
stands for all the other rocks, given the openness and 
imperfection of Katchadourian’s process, it is quite clear that it 
fails at this task, as linguistic translation—being an inexact 
science, an approximation—always fails to some extent. A 
quick glance at the images of the other rocks (especially when 
they are shown side by side in pairs) confirms this: the rocks 
have visible differences in shape, color, and texture. But a 
rock is a rock is a rock. To describe all the minute differences 
even between two of Katchadourian’s rather nondescript rocks 
would take thousands of words and an extensive knowledge of 
geology, and even then the description would not be exhaustive.  
 Amanda Boetzkes discusses her view of earth artists’ approach to the 
impossibility of representing the earth: “In contemporary practice [of earth art], nature is 
not a site that is subjected to human signification; it is present to the senses and, most 
importantly, it appears in its resistance to being subsumed into representation” (12). 
While Translation Exercise works on a vastly smaller scale than the earth art Boetzkes 
analyzes, through its failures Katchadourian’s piece also alludes to this “irreducibility” of 
Figure 18: 
Documentation from 
Translation Exercise 
(1993) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
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the natural world to human representation, whether through images, concepts, or 
language.  
Conclusion 
 Alaimo astutely observes that contemporary ecological crises arise from “[t]he 
evacuation of agency from nature [which] underwrites the transformation of the world 
into a passive repository of resources for human use” (Bodily 143). Both biosemiotics and 
trans-corporeality attempt to mend this conceptual rupture between Western humans, 
non-human animals, and the natural world by rethinking who and what should be 
recognized as having the ability to interpret, to possess agency, and to act creatively. 
Viewed in the context of these theories, Nina Katchadourian’s body of work, which 
stems from her “mindset of trying to be alert to things that [one] is passing over all the 
time,” extends that which is often seen as particularly human to non-human animals and 
the natural world (Attention 8). 
  Barnacle Mixer (2002; Figure 19) exemplifies how Katchadourian’s work goes 
about rethinking Western conceptualizations of non-human animals and the natural 
world. One day while on Pörtö’s rugged coast, Katchadourian noticed that the barnacles 
resembled little eyes peering out from the sides of the rocks. She then “found some 
plastic googly eyes in a craft shop and decided to introduce them all to one another, one 
type of object providing a kind of camouflage for the other. They were arranged to create 
social situations that resembled both flirting and mugging,” as she notes on her website. 
52 
  
 
 The attention Katchadourian pays to what is often overlooked has a way of 
enlivening the universe that is reminiscent of Grosz’s ideas about how art operates. “Art 
unleashes and intensifies, through the principles of composition, what science contains 
and slows down through the plane of reference, precisely the creative and destructive 
impact of vibratory force on bodies, on collectives, on the earth itself” (Grosz 62). The 
simple act of adding googly eyes to a seaside rock exemplifies this “unleashing” and 
“intensifying” of the chaos Grosz sees as structuring the “materiality of the universe” 
(61). The addition of googly eyes seemingly animates the rock’s denizens, and indeed, 
the whole rock. Instead of appearing to be an inert thing, the rock becomes abuzz with 
Figure 19: Detail of Barnacle Mixer (2002) by Nina Katchadourian 
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activity—the barnacles and googly eyes eying each other cautiously, then “socializing” in 
their own odd ways.  
 Barnacle Mixer, like a lot of Katchadourian’s work, is playful yet, at the same 
time, quite serious. What would the world be like if Western thought saw barnacles more 
as Katchadourian does? They are, in fact, not trivial—Darwin himself devoted eight years 
of his life to researching the arthropods’ strange habits (Quammen 226). Unlike Darwin, 
Katchadourian doesn’t provide her viewers with any facts about barnacles, nor does she 
prove anything about them. But, by merely suggesting that they are tiny subjective beings 
who have particular ways of experiencing the world, she does something perhaps just as 
powerful.  
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CHAPTER III 
NATURECULTURES IN NATURAL CROSSDRESSING AND MENDED 
SPIDERWEBS  
 In Western thought, nature and culture have long been considered entirely distinct 
from one another. In fact, Western conceptions of nature hinge on the very absence of 
human culture (Soper 15). The Oxford English Dictionary defines nature as: “the 
phenomena of the physical world collectively; esp. plants, animals, and other features and 
products of the earth itself, as opposed to humans and human creations”; the first use of 
the term in this manner dates back to the fourteenth century. Culture, in contrast, is 
defined as “the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded 
collectively.” As their definitions make apparent, the categories of nature and culture are 
thought of as mutually exclusive in the West. Scholars such as Bernadette Bensaude-
Vincent and William R. Newman maintain that while that the specifics of the opposition 
between nature and culture are constantly changing, the two have nevertheless been 
recognized as opposing forces throughout Western history (3-4). 
 Feminist science studies theorist Donna Haraway’s introduction of the concept of 
naturecultures represents a major challenge to the nature/culture dualism so pernicious in 
Western thought. For Haraway, the term naturecultures captures “the impossibility of 
uncoupling ‘nature’ from ‘culture’” (Bell 134). Far from being distinct, nature and culture 
are intricately interrelated, Haraway contends, such that ever determining whether 
something originates solely from nature or culture is not only impossible, but misguided. 
The concept of naturecultures implies that it is vital to recognize that nature and culture 
are nothing more than Western human constructions that describe our (always imprecise) 
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perceptions of the world. Nature and culture are not causal forces that shape the world; 
rather, the words themselves are simply attempts to classify what we see in the world. 
Biological and cultural determinism are both instances of misplaced 
concreteness—i.e. the mistake of first taking provisional and local 
category abstractions like “nature” and “culture” for the world and, 
second, mistaking potent consequences to be preexisting foundations. 
There are no preconstituted subjects and objects, and no single sources, 
unitary actors, or final ends. In Judith Butler’s terms, there are only 
“contingent foundations.” (Haraway, Companion 6). 
The term naturecultures, then, highlights the interdependence and mutual constitution of 
humans, other animals, and the natural world that the separate categories of “nature” and 
“culture” obscure. “Reality is an active verb,” Haraway writes, “and the nouns all seem to 
be gerunds with more appendages than an octopus” (Companion 6). 
 Haraway is by no means the first scholar to recognize that the nature/culture 
dualism is problematic. In essence, both biosemiotics and trans-corporeality are attempts 
to subvert this Western construct by recognizing the agencies of non-human animals, 
plants, and even, in the case of trans-corporeality, matter. Contemporary artists such as 
Nina Katchadourian are also engaged in these issues. In an essay on a 2000 show in 
which Katchadourian’s work appeared, Lisa Gabrielle Mark, the show’s curator, states 
“Nature” is a word in flux. By definition it denotes the entire physical 
universe […] The split between nature and artifice is a hangover from the 
old Cartesian worldview, allowing us to regard nature as “other” […] The 
natural phenomena—plants, animals, etc.—that we seek to observe, 
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exploit, and preserve actually embody both nature and artifice in a 
complex and continuous interrelationship [emphasis added] (11). 
In order to understand how Katchadourian’s work adds to the current discourse 
surrounding the problematic nature/culture binarism, this chapter will examine two of her 
pieces, Natural Crossdressing and Mended Spiderwebs, in light of Haraway’s concept of 
naturecultures. 
 By “collaborating” with non-human creatures to create art and intervening in the 
natural world with self-consciously crude “repairs” and inadequate “improvements,” 
Katchadourian problematizes traditional Western oppositions and hierarchies between 
nature and culture. In this way, Katchadourian’s artwork can be read as questioning the 
dualistic way that Western industrial societies view human culture and the natural world 
at a fundamental level, and as proposing a less categorical, more process-based 
worldview that acknowledges the “contingent foundations” of ever-evolving 
naturecultures.  
Natural Crossdressing 
 In a photograph entitled Natural Crossdressing (2002; Figure 20), Katchadourian 
appears from the collar bone up in front of a reddish-orange background. Her straight hair 
is tucked behind her ears and looks somewhat greasy and unkempt. She wears a black 
tee-shirt, a beret, and, at first glance, a moustache. On closer inspection, the moustache 
above Katchadourian’s upper lip turns out to be made of two greenish, fuzzy caterpillars, 
heads facing inwards, that are clearly alive and edging their way upwards towards the 
artist’s nose. Katchadourian looks down at the viewer with slightly furrowed brows and a 
neutral expression that looks like a subtle challenge: “What’s it to you?” her narrowed 
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eyes seem to say. The bold red and black color scheme, the low camera angle, and the 
imposing size of the piece (30x40 inches) add to this confrontational quality. 
 
 Like much of Katchadourian’s art, Natural Crossdressing came into being 
through happenstance. When she discovered a group of caterpillars on a tree outside her 
home, the visual similarity between the hairy, arching caterpillars and a moustache (two 
very different things) struck Katchadourian, and so she created the piece on a whim. “I 
thought a pair of them would make a perfect mustache,” she explains simply in her online 
statement on the piece (ninakatchadourian.com). However, the meaning of this self-
portrait goes way beyond just the quirky visual pun between caterpillars and moustaches 
that immediately strikes the viewer. Through an outwardly simple manoeuver, 
Katchadourian engages with complex issues of gender, nature, and artistry in Natural 
Crossdressing, ultimately implying that art itself is a complex knot of naturecultures.  
Figure 20: Natural 
Crossdressing (2002) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
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 Firstly, the fact that Katchadourian sports a black beret and moustache in this 
piece is significant: in the popular imagination, black berets and moustaches are 
associated with artists, perhaps due to the fact that many canonical artists, including 
Rembrandt, Cezanne, Monet, and Man Ray, have depicted themselves mustachioed 
wearing one of these iconic hats in a self-portrait (Figures 21-24) Although his self-
portraits don’t feature one, Picasso also wears a dark beret in many famous photos 
(Figure 25). As Katchadourian’s cross-dressing underscores, the beret-wearing, 
mustachioed stereotype of an artist is also typically male. In fact, the prototypical artist is 
generally imagined as male (Soussloff 4). At a fundamental level, then, Katchadourian’s 
self-portrait is a comment on the association of artistic genius with maleness, and on the 
male-dominated art world in general. In a larger sense, Natural Crossdressing plays with 
gender dualities, highlighting the role of gendered symbols in conveying ideas of artistry 
while satirizing associations between these cultural symbols and artistic identity.  
                   
Figure 21: Self Portrait with Velvet  
Beret (1634) by Rembrandt  
Figure 22: Self Portrait with a 
Beret (1886) by Claude Monet 
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 The fact that Katchadourian is cross-dressed in this self-portrait calls to mind 
Marcel Duchamp’s self-portraits (created with Man Ray’s help) as Rrose Sélavy 
(pronounced like “eros, c’est la vie”), his female and presumably non-artist alter-ego 
(Figure 26). The reference to Duchamp in Natural Crossdressing is fitting, since he was 
one of the first artists to turn found objects into art: Katchadourian’s caterpillars, in this 
case, are “found” in the most literal sense, in that Katchadourian just happened upon 
them. In Western thought, human/non-human animal relationships are typically viewed 
as subject/object relationships, in which humans are the active, thinking, observing 
subjects and animals are the passive, observed objects. Using caterpillars as found 
Figure 23: Self Portrait 
with Beret (1898) by Paul 
Cezanne  
Figure 24: Self Portrait with 
Beret (1946) by Man Ray 
Figure 25: Pablo Picasso in a beret in 1962 
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objects, then, can be read as a comment on how Western artists have traditionally viewed 
and made use of the natural world, and on the perceived agency in readymade art such as 
Duchamps’. While readymades could be considered the art form in which naturecultures 
and material agency are most apparent, since what is to become the art object is created 
in part or entirely by a complex of natural and cultural processes, the artist takes all the 
credit for transforming the object into art. Katchadourian’s caterpillars are the “potently 
consequential” beings of a rich evolutionary history, involving natural and cultural 
forces, yet Katchadourian ironically uses them as objects, turning them into art, and 
claiming sole authorship of the work. 
 
 Natural Crossdressing simultaneously plays into and subverts gender 
expectations of artistic self-representation. On the one hand, by donning a moustache, a 
beret, and a defiantly neutral expression, Katchadourian presents herself as a 
Figure 26:  Marcel Duchamp as 
Rrose Sélavy (c. 1920-21) 
Photographed by Man Ray  
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stereotypical, almost macho artist. By cross-dressing for a self-portrait, she aligns herself 
with Duchamp, the quintessential conceptual artist. On the other hand, her moustache is 
not a moustache at all (not even a fake one) but, instead, is made of caterpillars, and so it 
satirizes the assumption that raw artistic talent is necessarily connected to masculinity, 
and trumps Duchamps’ Dadaistic cross-dressing efforts by adding another layer of 
absurdity. 
 Natural Crossdressing, then, emphasizes the cultural-constructedness of the 
artist’s image, and by the same token, the cultural-constructedness of gender presentation. 
In Western thought, there is a long history of tension between the concepts of art and 
nature (Bensaude-Vincent and Newman 3-4), with art being placed within the realm of 
culture, not nature. Paradoxically, however, while skills such as drawing and painting can 
be taught to some extent (making them cultural), artistic talent is often thought of as 
innate, and even instinctual—in other words, deriving from nature or genetics. Natural 
Crossdressing calls into question the idea that talent and the drive to create derive simply 
from an artist’s own (male) nature, insisting that the artist him/herself is a cultural 
construction. By pointing out that artists consciously represent themselves as such, and, 
in so doing, reinforce their own identity, Katchadourian interrogates the naturalness of 
artistic genius. The presence of caterpillars in Katchadourian’s photograph, however, 
simultaneously situates art-making squarely within the natural world: in a sense, she 
implies that the caterpillars, representations of non-human nature, make the artist.  
 In situated histories, situated naturecultures […] all the actors become 
who they are in the dance of relating, not from scratch, not ex nihilo, but 
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full of the patterns of their sometimes joined, sometimes separate heritages 
both before and lateral to this encounter (Haraway, Companion 25). 
 By doing something considered unnatural—cross-dressing—using animals, 
Katchadourian locates herself within a complex tangle of naturecultures, while 
undermining dualistic notions of innate, individualistic, masculinist artistic genius.  
 Having a moustache is not natural for Katchadourian; however, it could be argued 
that her moustache of caterpillars is more natural than a real moustache, in that the 
caterpillars come from nature, as defined by the absence of humans. On her website, 
Katchadourian says of her self-portrait, “Crossdressing, an act that is generally thought of 
as [a] highly unnatural act, transpires here using entirely natural materials.” No matter 
how one looks at it, Natural Crossdressing breaks down the clear dichotomy between 
nature and culture, and skewers the gendered, natured expectations of the prototypical 
artist. 
 As Katchadourian’s above quote suggests, Natural Crossdressing is also a 
comment on the naturalness of gender play itself. Much of the stigma surrounding cross 
dressing, transexuality, and homosexuality in Western culture stems from (or is explained 
by) the notion that these behaviors and identities somehow violate the natural order: that 
(only) conventional gender roles and heterosexuality are natural24 (Mortimer-Sandilands 
and Erickson 31). Paradoxically, as Karen Barad points out, homosexual sex acts and 
nonnormative gender expression are condemned because those who participate in them 
are seen to be giving in to “beastial” desires—desires that only a proper adherence to 
morality (a purely human domain—humans being the sole moral agents) can prevent. 
                                                 
24
 The legal term, “crimes against nature,” which refers to sodomy and (other) homosexual sex acts, and 
which, in the U.S., not that long ago also referred to cross dressing, exemplifies this. 
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Barad contends that, whether nature is seen as the innocent wronged party or the perverse 
negative influence, the policing of deviant gender and sexual behavior is fundamentally 
an attempt at “securing the nature/culture divide,” precisely because morality itself is 
assumed to be what divides humans from animals (28). 
 Evolutionary theory, with its emphasis on sexual selection, is often used to justify 
the notion that homosexuality is not natural, since if homosexual sex is not reproductive, 
evolution would weed out homosexual genetics within a generation or two if they were 
naturally occurring in a population. Of course, scientists are learning that evolution is not 
nearly as simplistic as ideas like this purport it to be; feminist science studies theorists 
have also shown that cultural biases (such as heteronormativity, transphobia, and 
homophobia) have significantly influenced scientific research (Alaimo 54). For decades, 
scientists have been explaining away observed homosexual behavior in the animal 
kingdom by asserting that it serves non-sexual functions, or by simply misidentifying the 
sex of the animals involved (Bagemihl 122). As Barad says, “Values and facts are cooked 
together as part of the same brew” (“Entanglements” 16). 
 Thus, Katchadourian’s use of caterpillars as a prop for cross-dressing combined 
with the assumption that caterpillars are “natural” provokes this question of the 
naturalness of transvestitism. Generally thought of as a behavior only humans engage in, 
transvestitism has now been documented in many other animal species. In his extensive 
(but by no means exhaustive) account of diverse sexual behavior in the animal kingdom, 
biologist Bruce Bagemihl explains that there are two types of animal transvestitism: 
physical, in which an animal physically resembles the other sex, and behavioral, in which 
an animal behaves as one of the other sex does.  Physical transvestitism has been 
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observed in butterflies, squid, birds, deer, and snakes (Bagemihl 38). Bighorn sheep are 
one example of a species in which behavioral transvestitism is relatively common 
(Bagemihl 39). 
 Haraway explicitly links the nature/culture dualism with issues of sex and gender, 
contending that even Western feminism’s important distinction between sex and gender 
(meant to dissociate “cultural” gender from “natural” sex and thus allow for 
nonnormative gender expression) hinges on the nature/culture binarism. 
Nature is only the raw material of culture, appropriated, preserved, 
enslaved, exalted, or otherwise made flexible for disposal by culture in the 
logic of capitalist colonialism. Similarly, [in this logic] sex is only the 
matter to the act of gender […] It has seemed all but impossible to avoid 
the trap of an appropriationist logic of domination built into the 
nature/culture binarism and its generative lineage, including the 
sex/gender distinction. (Haraway, Primate 13).  
Judith Butler argues that physical sex can never be viewed outside of cultural gender 
norms: that sex is “always already gender” (21). In light of this, Katchadourian’s use of 
caterpillars specifically is also symbolically significant, for caterpillars, long and phallic, 
metamorphose into butterflies, which have a more vaginal shape. Thus, the caterpillars in 
this piece neatly underscore the message that gender is fluid, and that this fluidity is 
naturalcultural.  
 The caterpillars in this piece are, however, still used as a symbol, which seems 
like a very human thing to do. In fact, the distinction between humans and non-human 
animals is often framed as humanity’s ability to think symbolically and creatively. As 
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discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, biosemiotics questions the assumption that nature is 
fundamentally instinctual, preprogrammed, and non-creative. The importance of this 
paradigm shift in how we think about nature cannot be overstated, for biosemiotic theory 
implies that evolution is fundamentally a creative process: non-human (as well as human) 
beings’ survival hinges on their ability to use what is at their disposal (in terms of both 
their own genetically-inherited body parts, and what they come across in their 
environment) in novel ways that fit their particular niche in space and time. 
So, in light of biosemiotic theory, Katchadourian’s use of natural creatures as a 
symbol does not, in fact, support the idea that humans are differentiated from the natural 
world by symbolic thought. The caterpillars in Natural Crossdressing, while appearing 
inanimate at first, actually subtly assert their own agency. About the making of the piece, 
Katchadourian states on her website, “[i]t was a difficult photo shoot, since they [the 
caterpillars] kept trying to crawl up my nose.” This indicates that the caterpillars 
themselves were engaged in a biosemiotic process when the photo was taken. When 
placed on Katchadourian’s upper lip, the caterpillars began interpreting a new, strange 
situation, one to which their genetics could not have preprogrammed them to respond. In 
an interesting way, the caterpillars are shown making a connection between two 
unrelated, but visually similar things, just as Katchadourian did when she decided to use 
them as a moustache: the looming dark nostrils that the caterpillars encountered on 
Katchadourian’s face perhaps looked to them like something familiar—maybe a crevice 
in a tree or hole in the ground in which to hide. Just as Katchadourian is completely 
mistaken about caterpillars making a good moustache (she ended up having to use honey 
to get the caterpillars to stick to her face for even the few seconds it took to snap a 
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picture), so too are the caterpillars mistaken in thinking that a human nose is a good place 
to hide. However, all three organisms (the two caterpillars as well as Katchadourian) are 
creatively engaging with their surroundings in novel ways. 
Furthermore, the caterpillars, through their creative agency, actually add meaning 
to the piece by arcing upward in their attempt to reach Katchadourian’s nostrils. Her 
eyebrows, eyes, nose, and mouth all arc downwards, as does her beret. Her chin curves 
upward, but at the sides, rather than the center as the caterpillars do. So, in addition to 
their simply being green and fuzzy and therefore out of place on Katchadourian’s smooth, 
light-beige skin, the caterpillars visually emphasize their own foreignness—their 
otherness—on her face by the direction of the line that they create. Thus the caterpillars 
collaborate in Katchadourian’s creative process. Although this collaboration is likely 
intentional only in the sense that the caterpillars are trying to get to a place of perceived 
safety, Katchadourian’s creative process similarly relies on spontaneity and often results 
in unintended, but meaningful consequences.25  
At many levels, then, Natural Crossdressing is about the gap between who is 
perceived to be engaged in art-making, and who is actually involved in creative 
processes. Through a spontaneously generated visual pun, Natural Crossdressing calls 
into question dualistically gendered expectations of artists, ideas of what types of 
behavior are considered natural versus unnatural, and views of the natural world that 
preclude creativity. In all of these ways, Natural Crossdressing hints at the nexus of 
naturecultures involved in the creation of art, problematizing ideas of solitary human 
authorship of art and of art’s opposition to nature.  
                                                 
25
 While Katchadourian did presumably choose this particular photo from a number of slightly different 
shots, thus perhaps emphasizing the caterpillars’ agency and collaboration, the caterpillars were still active 
participants in her creative process. 
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Mended Spiderwebs #19 (Laundry Line) 
 Arguably Katchadourian’s most famous series, and one that provides more insight 
into the way interactions with the natural world address the idea of naturecultures in her 
work, is Mended Spiderwebs. To create these pieces, she writes on her website, she 
meticulously “repaired” broken spider webs by patching them with tiny segments of 
bright red thread: “[t]he short threads were held in place by the stickiness of the spider 
web itself; longer threads were reinforced by dipping the tips into white glue.” When she 
was done, she documented her work through photography. Unsure whether the spiders 
would notice or care, she waited to see what they would do. In all cases, even on webs 
that appeared to be abandoned, the spiders reacted by removing her repairs and fixing 
their webs by the next morning (Katchadourian, “Attention” 12). Katchadourian then 
collected the discarded red-thread patches and displayed them in shadowboxes alongside 
the photos (Figure 27). 
 
 In one piece in the series, Mended Spiderweb #19 (Laundry Line) (1998; Figure 
28), two roughly half-circle spider webs are attached to a rough-barked, mossy tree on the 
right side of the image. A few of the webs’ long strands are also attached to the 
Figure 27: View of 
Mended Spiderweb #8 
(Fish Patch) (1998) 
by Nina 
Katchadourian 
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clothesline anchored on one side by the tree. The clothesline cuts across the image 
horizontally, delineating the top third of the picture frame. Clipped to the left side of the 
clothesline are two brightly colored clothespins, one right-side up and the other upside-
down. Somewhat out of focus in the background is a dark house, which contrasts with the 
light spider webs in the foreground. The light on the roof of the house is dappled, 
suggesting, along with the patch of trees in the distant background, that the house is 
surrounded by forest. Each of the spider webs has multiple red-thread patches created by 
Katchadourian: the top web has two patches, and the bottom one has three. The lines of 
the patches, which were clearly inserted very carefully, are nevertheless uneven and 
messy compared to the more ordered lines of the spider webs; Katchadourian’s thread is 
also thicker in diameter than the spider silk, augmenting the patches’ clumsy, hack-job 
appearance.  
 
 This piece plays with and subverts the dichotomy between nature and culture in a 
number of ways, including its composition, its references to weaving and spiders, and its 
representation of interaction between artist and animal. Firstly, the photograph’s visual 
Figure 28: Mended 
Spiderweb #19 
(Laundry Line) 
(1998) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
69 
layout introduces both juxtapositions and amalgamations of nature and culture. Thinking 
dualistically for a moment, we can read the mossy tree on the right side and the spider 
webs attached to it as symbolic of nature. The clothesline, clothespins, and house are all, 
of course, reminders of human culture. Katchadourian’s patches, which have been 
introduced into the spider webs, are obviously human-made, although they are attempting 
to mimic nature, and are, in fact, enveloped by nature. The strong verticality of the tree 
juxtaposed with the horizontality of the clothesline creates a literal intersection between 
nature and culture.  
 Perhaps more interestingly, the theme of the intersection or interconnectedness of 
culture and nature is echoed in the conceptual significance of the spiderwebs. Spiders 
have long been associated with weaving, as Katchadourian herself attests in an interview.  
“I initially reacted to the fact that the spider webs looked broken, and I 
deliberately picked a method of fixing them that was very human: darning, 
stitching, or sewing—but these methods also connected to a spider’s act of 
spinning or weaving.” (Katchadourian, “Attention” 12). 
As this quote shows, spinning and weaving are not exclusively human acts: spiders also 
engage in creating through these methods, and rather more skillfully than humans. In 
describing how spider webs function, Peter Rice, a structural engineer, explains the 
intricacies of their design.  
The key to the structure of the spider's web lies in its shape and stress 
distribution. By allowing large elongation of the threads, the maximum 
proportion of kinetic energy from a flying insect is absorbed as strain 
energy. The multiple redundancy of the radial threads ensures that the web 
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will function even if many radials break. The spider is using the 
techniques of the late twentieth century engineer, but with much more 
elegance and precision” (“A Spider's Way”).  
Katchadourian emphasizes the superiority of the spider’s spinning skill through the 
relatively crude look of her patches; the spider’s rejection of them drives this point home.  
 Weaving itself is also indicative of naturecultures: “For every civilization, textiles 
have marked the intersection of nature, culture, and technology” (Mark 12). Often made 
from natural materials by human hands, weavings are both natural and cultural. 
Katchadourian’s weaving of human-made thread into a natural spider web emphasizes 
this idea. Furthermore, that spider acts of web-making are described as weaving suggests 
that spider behavior, like human behavior, has developed through their own intricate 
history of naturecultures.   
 In her analysis of Mended Spiderwebs, Lisa Gabrielle Mark points out that spiders 
belong to the class of animals called arachnids, whose name relates directly to the Greek 
myth of Arachne.26 Arachne was a great weaver who refused to give the goddess Athena 
credit for the skill that she (Arachne) possessed, although it was obvious that her talent 
was derived from the goddess: “Pallas [Athena] her mistress shone in every line [of 
Arachne’s weaving]./This the proud maid with scornful air denies”  (Ovid). Arachne’s 
pride angered Athena so much that she eventually turned Arachne into a spider. 
 The Arachne myth allows a reading of the (implied) spiders in Mended 
Spiderwebs as indicative of transformation, and of blurring the lines between constructed 
categories such as human and non-human animal, as well as between nature and culture, 
drawing parallels to the caterpillars in Natural Crossdressing. Ovid’s Metamorphosis, the 
                                                 
26
 Arachne also means spider in Greek. 
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narrative poem in which the myth of Arachne is preserved, is, in fact, a collection of tales 
of many different human/animal transfigurations describing the creation of the world. 
Interestingly, this suggests a lost tradition in Western culture that recognized the 
permeability of boundaries between human and non-human, nature and culture—in other 
words, a tradition that may have had some sort of conception of naturecultures. 
 The human hubris exhibited by Arachne relates to Katchadourian’s act of trying 
to repair the spider webs: just as Arachne assumes that her skill is superior to, and 
separate from, that of the goddess Athena, Katchadourian’s act of patching spider webs 
satirically suggests that humans are more capable than nature (embodied by the spiders) 
of repairing a spider web, and that human skill or artifice is something unique among 
living creatures, and distinct from the natural world.  
 The interaction between the spiders and artist in Mended Spiderwebs is also 
indicative of the concept of naturecultures. The artist’s web repairs disturb the spiders’ 
senses of order, pointing out that spiders have different, and, in this case, perhaps more 
exacting aesthetics than humans do. The rejection of Katchadourian’s clumsy patches 
attests to the idea that spiders are “the perfectionists among nature’s tailors” (Spaid). This 
underscores a sense of the spider’s agency, and thus its specific (and nature’s more 
general) role in Katchadourian’s art-making. The spider’s patch rejection also implies the 
existence of spider culture. In intervening in the natural world and allowing the spider 
time to respond, Katchadourian allows the naturecultures inherent in the creation of art to 
surface.  
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Conclusion 
 In Natural Crossdressing and Mended Spiderwebs #19, Nina Katchadourian plays 
with conceptions of nature and culture in numerous ways, interrogating the traditional 
Western opposition between the two categories while revealing both their 
constructedness and the relationships they obscure. Donna Haraway’s term 
naturecultures, which emphasizes the inseparability of nature and culture, provides a 
basis for understanding the complex webs of naturalcultural strands that Katchadourian’s 
work attempts to make more apparent. In Natural Crossdressing, Katchadourian raises 
questions about the naturalness of artmaking and transvestitism, challenging viewers to 
think beyond dualisms such as male/female, human/non-human animal, and 
nature/culture and to acknowledge the complex legacies of naturecultures involved in the 
creation of art. Mended Spiderwebs #19 brings up the interconnectedness of nature and 
culture through allusions to weaving, human/spider transfiguration, and artist/spider 
interaction. Both pieces illustrate the many overlooked ways in which naturecultures are 
inherent in art, and in human existence as a whole, and gesture towards the complex 
semiotic fabric of the biosphere. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IRONY, ANIMAL REPRESENTATION, AND THE FAMILIAR IN 
KATCHADOURIAN’S CHLOE AND DION’S SCALA NATURAE 
 [E]ven if scientists are good at what they do, they’re not necessarily adept in the 
field of representation. They don’t have access to the rich set of tools, like irony […] and 
humour, which are the meat and potatoes of art and literature. 
—Mark Dion, “Miwon Kwon in conversation with Mark Dion” 
 This chapter compares the use of irony in Nina Katchadourian’s piece Chloe 
(1994) with that of a piece first exhibited in the same year, Mark Dion’s Scala Naturae 
(1994). Both pieces use taxidermied animals to make an ironic comment on Western 
classification of animals. I demonstrate that, while Scala Naturae’s ironic view of animal 
classification becomes uncertain upon analysis, Chloe’s interrogation of the familiar 
undergirds an ironic world relation akin to what Bronislaw Szerszynski terms “ironic 
ecology.” 
Scala Naturae 
 Various earth-toned objects rest on a pure white staircase that rises ten feet off the 
floor, yet leads nowhere, and couldn’t be climbed without difficulty anyway, due to the 
clutter. The structure seems to dwarf the small gallery space, although it is actually 
contained quite comfortably. Two thin, unfinished wooden posts support the staircase’s 
back. The stairs diminish in size as they recede upwards, making the top look farther 
away than it is. On the bottom step are antique, human-made objects, including a small 
wagon wheel, a cracked clay pot, a clock, and a pair of calipers; on the second, rocks, 
minerals and fungi; the third, dried gourds, fruits, a cactus, a pinecone, and other plant 
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matter; the fourth, dried sea sponges, corals, and starfish; the fifth, bivalve and gastropod 
shells; the sixth, pinned butterflies, other insects, and crustaceans; the seventh, a 
taxidermied octopus and jars containing other cephalopods in alcohol; the eighth, a 
taxidermied frog and fish, and a snake in a jar. A taxidermied duck and tabby cat sit on 
the ninth step. On the tenth and top step, in the empty space between the two animals, 
rests a small white bust of Aristotle (Corrin 74). This piece, Scala Naturae (Figure 29) by 
Mark Dion, is named after Aristotle’s hierarchy of matter and life of the same name, 
which translates to “the ladder or stairway of nature”, and is generally referred to in 
English as “the great chain of being.”  
  
Figure 29: View of Scala Naturae (1994) by Mark Dion 
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 It seems clear that Scala Naturae is meant to be read ironically. Art historian and 
curator Dieter Buchhart writes, “[t]he arrangement of objects [in Scala Naturae] is 
obviously deliberately ironized, in that Dion places human interventions on the lowest 
step […] in a way that temporalizes natural history” (24). Buchhart argues that although 
these human-made objects invite comparisons with the vanitas genre of still life, bringing 
up a sense of time (some quite obviously, like the half-burnt candle and the clock, and 
others more obliquely, such as the broken jug, the weathered book, and the old-fashioned 
wagon wheel), the piece’s middle steps “present unchanging pieces of the natural world 
in much the same way as a natural history museum,” and the work’s overall structure is 
static (24).  
 Curator Lisa Graziose Corrin identifies a more basic irony in Scala Naturae: she 
writes that the piece is a “straightfaced subversion” of Aristotle’s highly influential 
concept, which the piece represents literally, if not quite accurately27 (71).  This 
“straightfaced-ness” implies what poet and scholar D.C. Meucke calls “impersonal 
irony.”28 This type of irony is “characterised by a dryness of tone, in which the ironist 
absents themselves, simply presenting their words, and not indicating overtly to the 
listener that the communication is meant as ironic or sarcastic” (Szerszynski 345). Dion 
not only structures Scala Naturae roughly according to Aristotle’s concept, he also 
                                                 
27
 For example, in Aristotle’s original conception of the scala naturae, birds are just below “viviparous 
quadrupeds” (i.e. mammals), and fish are just below “oviparous quadrupeds” (i.e. amphibians and reptiles). 
Aristotle also did not include fungi, plants, or human-made objects in his classification, although they were 
often included in medieval conceptions of the great chain of being, as were rocks, minerals, and dirt. 
(Waggoner). 
 
28
 Impersonal irony is a form of what Muecke calls “communicative irony,” which “whether verbal, visual 
or musical, involve[s] a communication in which the overt, surface meaning of the communication is in 
tension with the actual meaning intended to be communicated” (Szerszynski 341). 
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employs the quaint aesthetics of historical wunderkammers, or cabinets of curiosities29, 
juxtaposing specimens preserved in various ways with human-made objects. Although 
even the piece’s title doesn’t betray any sarcasm, it seems clear to modern-day viewers, 
especially given the art museum context of the piece, that Dion does not actually think 
that this is an accurate classification of life. Anything this hierarchical, this proto-
scientific, and this dusty is clearly outmoded—there is no need for further modification to 
get the point across. Viewers might think, “How misguided were the naturalists of the 
past, thinking mushrooms and minerals belonged on the same shelf (though not 
intermingled—they must have known there was a difference)! How quirky and 
unexpectedly shrewd they were to differentiate between starfish and mollusks, allotting 
them two separate stairs!” Despite the elaborateness and minutia of the work’s physical 
presence, the point seems very simple: Dion’s barren irony functions like an invisible but 
glaringly red circle-backslash symbol (i.e. ): Aristotle was wrong, we cannot 
hierarchize life, at least not the way he did. A contemporary viewer may wonder if the 
work is suggesting that all life is equal or that there is a more accurate way to decide 
which life forms are higher and which lower, but she/he is not likely to question or 
complicate the basic irony of Scala Naturae’s message. 
 However, a quote from Dion himself that, like an artist’s statement of sorts, 
appears beneath the image of Scala Naturae on PBS’s Art21 Website, calls this 
seemingly obvious impersonal irony into question. 
It’s a very complex relationship between the natural and the cultural. 
Certainly, we are of nature. But if you begin to blur that to a certain point 
and believe that all artificial culture—the noosphere, the sphere of human 
                                                 
29
 Dion often recreates wunderkammer in his work. 
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activity—is natural, that seems to cause a lot of problems. Then we don’t 
need the terms “natural” and “cultural”; we can just say everything’s 
natural. But I don’t really think that’s the case. We come from the natural 
world but, clearly, we are distinctively different in our relationship to 
every other animal on the planet because of our language capabilities, 
because we have a sense of history, because we are able to store 
information and knowledge in a way that other animals can’t. Of course, 
we’ve evolved that way naturally. (Dion, qtd. in Art21)  
In other words, while the details of Aristotle’s classification are perhaps not quite 
accurate, by the very fact of categorizing and cataloging life, Aristotle (and others) prove 
humankind to be “different,” (and, by implication, superior) to other animals and other 
life forms. The simple existence of the concept of scala naturae (which relies on 
language and the knowledge transmission it permits) seemingly justifies, for Dion, the 
placement of humans on the top step.30 This, of course, is circular reasoning,31 a logical 
fallacy of which Aristotle would surely be ashamed. Read in relation to Dion’s statement, 
then, Scala Naturae’s irony shifts from impersonal irony to what Muercke terms “irony 
of self-betrayal,” in which “characters unconsciously ironize[s] themselves” by using 
“self-contradictory arguments” (59): while Dion’s piece seems to be meant ironically, his 
statement contradicts that intention. However, this perhaps unintended32 irony does not 
                                                 
30
 Whether or not, in Dion’s view, there are multiple steps below humans, or just one, remains unclear. 
 
31
 Humans can classify ourselves as superior to non-human beings, therefore humans are superior to non-
human beings. 
 
32
 Arguing about what artists intended or did not intend is not only extremely sticky territory, but is often 
beside the point, especially in an era where “the author is dead,” and art, like texts, is therefore presumed to 
speak for itself. So, in a sense, it doesn’t matter if Dion is aware or not that his public persona’s argument 
relies on circular logic; his utterance, whether or not it was a performance or an accurate representation of 
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invalidate Scala Naturae as a meaningful piece of art; on the contrary, it adds new levels 
of meaning, which I will discuss in relation to Chloe. As English and comparative 
literature scholar Linda Hutcheon writes, “irony rarely involves a simple decoding of a 
single inverted message; […] it is more often a semantically complex process of relating, 
differentiating, and combining said and unsaid meanings—and doing so with some 
evaluative edge” (89). 
Chloe 
 Chloe perches in the exact center of an overstuffed decorative pillow, fluffy ears 
perked and pigtail-like, glassy eyes raised to human eye-level, the hint of a smile playing 
about her tiny snout. Eternally rapt by the promise of an unseen treat, toy, or warm lap, 
she radiates alertness, obedience, and attention. The striped silk pillow’s tassel is an 
extension of her posture; a peach-colored towel tucked beneath her luxurious fur is her 
environment’s only concession to dogness.  
 Chloe, a Papillion spaniel, is dead and stuffed. Chloe, the beloved pet of an older 
female Palm Springs resident, is on loan and on display, in a plexiglass case, as art in 
Katchadourian’s piece by the same name (Figure 30). 
 The artist team Olly and Suzi, who create artwork in collaboration with 
dangerously wild carnivores, has said, “‘A woman walking down the road with a 
Chihuahua is not really as fascinating as a shark…because a pet like that seems to have 
become a bit human’” (Qtd. in Baker 177). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari, quite 
(in)famously, write “Anyone who likes dogs or cats is a fool [emphasis in original]” 
                                                                                                                                                 
his “true” intentions, whatever that might mean, is therefore open to interpretation in relation to his 
artwork. Hutcheon situates the intentionality inherent in irony (which distinguishes irony from lying) with 
the interpreter, not the piece’s creator: “it is not a matter of the interpreter ‘reconstructing’ the exact 
meaning the ironist intended” rather it is “the complexity of the potential interaction of interpreter, ironist 
and text [that] make[s] irony happen”(123).  
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(240). The philosophers pointedly contrast a literary example of their sacrosanct concept 
of “becoming-animal” with “the little cat or dog owned by an elderly woman who honors 
and cherishes it” (244). “Becoming-animal” does not, apparently, apply to domestic 
animals—only wild animals, and even then, only those who live in packs.  
 
 
 At first glance, Chloe seems to be another example of impersonal irony: a visual 
translation of Olly and Suzi’s disinterest in and Deleuze and Guattari’s postmodern 
disdain for the familiar, the feminine (both quotes mention women, after all), the 
domestic, the trite, the cutesy, the sentimental, and the anthropomorphic. Contemporary 
viewers, at least those who would never consider preserving their pets’ dead bodies, 
Figure 30: View of Chloe (1994) by Nina Katchadourian 
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immediately feel as if we’re in on the joke, as if we, like Katchadourian, appreciate the 
ridiculousness of the case’s mundane contents.  
 To love a pet, let alone an almost decorative lap dog, so much that one literally 
cannot bear to part with her after she is dead appears, to viewers who consider themselves 
more “with it” than well-to-do old ladies, to be the height of sentimentality and excess. 
(Will the old woman do the same thing when her next dog dies? Will she end up with 
taxidermied pooches adorning every room of her already [but professionally] over-
decorated house?) 
 It is only when one realizes that Katchadourian intended for Chloe to be displayed 
in a natural history museum, amidst its collection of taxidermic wildlife, rather than in 
this homey, white-walled, and otherwise empty gallery space, that the irony of the work’s 
message becomes less certain, or at least more nuanced and contradictory. For, although 
Katchadourian was commissioned by the natural history museum for which Chloe  was 
created, the museum ultimately refused to allow the taxidermied dog to be displayed 
(only the plexiglass case, pillow, towel, and a framed photograph of Chloe were included 
in the exhibit—see Figure 31). Katchadourian writes on her website that the museum 
claimed the inclusion of the actual taxidermied dog would be “offensive, and that people 
would find the situation confusing and that children might get upset.” 
 It’s undeniable that, in a low-light museum setting, between identical cases 
bearing plaques with Latinate names, one containing an enormous stuffed vulture perched 
on a rock, and the other some stuffed song birds on a dead tree branch, Chloe would have 
operated on one level as a punch line—“ha ha, a diorama of Canis lupus familiaris in its 
‘natural’ habitat.” This reading of Chloe as a pet displayed among wild animals would 
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Figure 31: View of Chloe (1994) by Nina Katchadourian displayed in the natural 
history museum 
 
classify the piece as what Muecke calls “irony of simple incongruity,” which is “an 
ironical technique to juxtapose without comment two contradictory statements or 
incongruous images” (61). Katchadourian’s website description of the piece also brings 
in an element of “self-disparaging irony,” in which “the ironist brings himself [sic] 
onstage, so to speak, in the character of an ignorant, credulous, earnest or over-
enthusiastic person” (Muecke 56). Katchadourian writes that in creating Chloe, 
I interviewed Chloe's owner on the phone about Chloe's natural habitat: a 
house with a cream-colored carpet, a special pillow, and a peach-colored 
towel that Chloe slept on. I proposed setting up Chloe in the same manner 
as the other animals in the Natural History Museum: presented in a vitrine, 
with signage indicating Latin name, habitat, etc. The museum, however, 
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refused to exhibit the piece […even though] I pointed out that Chloe was 
genetically very much like the Coyote who lived in a nearby diorama, and 
that the Coyote didn't seem to upset or confuse anyone too much, but to no 
avail. 
Although Katchadourian, by her own admission, sets out to bring up “interesting 
questions around the natural and the unnatural” by displaying a stuffed lap dog in a 
natural history museum, she feigns ignorance at the museum’s issue with her piece. What 
is clear is that Chloe is meant to be humorous; however, given Chloe’s use of multiple 
kinds of irony, it becomes unclear at whose expense the joke is directed: Chloe’s owner, 
postmodernists who disdain pets, the museum, and Katchadourian herself all seem to be 
possibilities. In this way, Chloe (the artwork, and undoubtedly the dog as well, albeit 
quite sincerely) begs the viewer for more than just the cursory attention required to get 
the joke. 
The Familiar in Postmodernism 
 Steve Baker, in his book The Postmodern Animal, identifies a “fear of the 
familiar” inherent in much postmodern art and theory about animals: an odd “postmodern 
orthodoxy” (166) that, despite the iconoclastic dualism-shattering that defines the era, 
upholds Western culture’s traditional “rhetoric of the wild and the tame, the admirable 
wolf and the contemptible dog” (169). He attributes the fear of the familiar animal in 
postmodern art and philosophy to two factors, the first being the idea that what is familiar 
is safe and non-challenging. Postmodern art, with its roots in the avant-garde and its 
imperative to question authority and traditional values and to continually push 
boundaries, is inclined towards shocking its viewers and thus “has no stomach for the 
83 
safe, the tame” (Baker 170). Secondly, postmodernism in general is characterized by 
what Donald Griffin has termed “‘anthropomorphophobia’—a fear of being ‘accused of 
uncritical sentimentality’ in the depiction or discussion of animals. They [postmodernists] 
seem almost unanimous in regarding sentimentality as a bad thing” (qtd. in Baker, 
Postmodern 175).  
 Since Baker’s book was published in 2000, animal studies scholars have been 
quick to call for corrections for this blind spot in postmodernist thought, as well as 
attempt to correct it themselves. In his article, “Deconstructing the Animal in Search of 
the Real,” Giovanni Aloi calls for “[t]he familiarity of the commonplace, that normative 
quality which allows communication to take place, [to] now come to be seen as a 
productive starting point in the discussion of the animal, rather than a barrier or 
obstacle”(s85). In her book, When Species Meet, which attempts to take seriously the 
relations between companion animals such as humans and dogs, Donna Haraway writes 
“I think we learn to be worldly from grappling with, rather than generalizing from, the 
ordinary” (4). Of her choice to focus theoretical attention on domestic dogs, she says, 
“Canis lupus familiaris indeed; the familiar is always where the uncanny lurks”(45). 
 In a 1993 essay, David Foster Wallace, a contemporary American novelist and 
essayist, addresses what he sees as a sea change in the goals of art (primarily literary, but 
also visual) in relation to the familiar. 
[R]ealistic fiction’s big job used to be to afford easements across borders, 
to help readers leap over the walls of self and locale and show us unseen 
or -dreamed-of people and cultures and ways to be. Realism made the 
strange familiar. Today, when we can eat Tex-Mex with chopsticks while 
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listening to reggae and watching a Soviet-satellite newscast of the Berlin 
Wall’s fall—i.e., when darn near everything presents itself as familiar—
it’s not a surprise that some of today’s most ambitious realistic fiction is 
going about trying to make the familiar strange (172). 
Viewed in light of Wallace’s observation, Olly and Suzi’s work with wild animals is not 
necessarily diametrically opposed to what Katchadourian is up to in Chloe; both, in fact, 
can be seen as responses to the fact that viewers are accustomed to the sight of all kinds 
of animals—sharks and leopards on TV and in zoos, as well as dogs everywhere—and, in 
albeit very different ways, as attempting to destabilize viewers’ unquestioning familiarity 
with the animals in question. 
 As touched on in Chapter II of this thesis, Katchadourian’s body of work as a 
whole represents nothing if not sustained engagements with the familiar, and not just as 
subject matter, but as her art materials themselves. These engagements often render what 
seems unremarkable and banal suddenly strange, as in the case of Chloe. Katchadourian 
not only takes inspiration from her immediate surroundings, no matter how mundane, but 
also sometimes purposely limits herself to working with what is at hand and nothing 
more. This she does at the risk of seeming dull, unserious, even trite, that most cardinal 
sin in postmodernism. In fact, her Seat Assignment series, in which she limited herself 
most strictly to whatever materials were at hand, documenting her work with just a cell 
phone camera, has been accused of lacking gravity: Gilbert May, for instance, finds these 
pieces “terminally stuck in the oxygen-light atmosphere of 80s ‘PoMo’ irony”(80). 
 Why, then, this engagement with the commonplace? The animal studies theorists 
who call for attention to the familiar do so for various reasons: some, like Baker and 
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Haraway, are concerned with breaking down residual dualisms, such as those between 
wild and tame, and animal and human; others, like Aloi, seem more concerned with 
making the question of the animal accessible to audiences wider than just the animal 
studies community. But, although in retrospect Katchadourian seems to have anticipated 
the challenge that these theorists put forth, it does not necessarily follow that 
Katchadourian shared the scholars’ motivations   
  Like Chloe, Scala Naturae includes a “mundane” domestic animal—the 
taxidermied tabby cat— but with no visual distinction made between the wild and the 
domestic. The cat is higher up on the staircase than most of the other animals, but as 
her/his companion on the step is the wild duck, it appears that the cat is there simply as a 
representative of non-human mammals, just as the duck is a representative of birds. By 
virtue of their size and dark colors, the cat and duck dominate the scene, while the white 
philosopher’s bust behind blends into the background. Baker calls this juxtaposition “at 
once homely and uncanny” (Postmodern 183); Corrin sees “the stunning physicality of 
the natural objects [as] contrast[ing] sharply with the metaphysical realm of ideas implied 
by the blank space left above the philosopher’s head” (74). Dion’s piece thus emphasizes 
the impotence of philosophical schemas to deal with animals’ “stunning” materiality, 
even that of familiar animals like housecats. 
Animal Representation 
 Scala Naturae and Chloe are not unique among contemporary artworks for their 
utilization of taxidermied animals—in fact Aloi points out that it has become 
(problematically) trendy to use real, preserved animals in recent installations. This is, in 
one respect, one response to “a postmodern age ‘marked by a deeply felt loss of faith in 
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our ability to represent the real’” (Baker, “Sloughing” 159). A taxidermied animal is not 
only dead (either having died from natural causes or, more sinisterly, having been killed 
purposely for “preservation”), it is literally skinned or hollowed out in order to create its 
own representation. In this sense, the stuffed and mounted animal is itself an apt, if 
unsettling, representation of the very crisis of representation in postmodernism, for it 
implies both the violence and the ultimate inadequacy of attempts to speak for the other: 
to attempt to represent an animal is, at worst, to kill it, or at best, to preserve in an 
entirely artificial way just a small part of it for the sole purpose of human visuality. Baker 
writes, “non-manipulation of the animal can perhaps be seen as one postmodern ambition 
or ideal” (Postmodern 82); seen in this light, taxidermy is a sort of manipulated 
semblance of non-manipulation, interesting because it walks the line between the real and 
the utterly fake. Moreover, the use of taxidermy to represent familiar animals such as 
lapdogs and housecats underscores the difficulty of representing even commonplace 
fauna.  
 Both Chloe and Scala Naturae’s use of familiar but taxidermied animals raises 
questions about animal representation, particularly representation by classification. In the 
latter artwork, an ancient attempt to classify life is shown to be all the more problematic 
by the fact that the life represented is, in fact, dead. In spite of Dion’s professed views to 
the contrary, Aristotle is revealed as having set up an impossible task for himself: to put 
life, characterized by dynamism and interrelatedness, into static, disparate, lifeless 
categories. It is not simply that the quirky and, to modern eyes, somewhat arbitrary 
categories Aristotle settled on were wrong; to attempt to categorize life at all seems 
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inherently problematic, since categorization, Scala Naturae implies, somehow misses or 
misleads about what is most essential about life: its liveliness and interconnectedness.  
Enmeshedness 
 In contrast to Scala Naturae, Chloe pokes fun at conventional systems of 
classification, but also comments on the implications of taxidermy itself and on the 
seeming familiarity of pets. Katchadourian writes that when the museum objected to her 
piece, “[she] pointed out that Chloe was genetically very much like the Coyote who lived 
in a nearby diorama, and that the Coyote didn't seem to upset or confuse anyone too 
much, but to no avail” (ninakatchadourian.com). In other words, if a dog is, according to 
genetics, similar to a coyote, why doesn’t she belong in a natural history museum? What 
systems of classification, other than taxonomy, are at play here? One answer is that 
Chloe, as the aforementioned Olly and Suzi quote indicates, is too close to human, or too 
infected with contemporary industrial humanness, to be put in a natural history museum. 
For it is not just that Chloe is a dog that is problematic; unfortunately, one could very 
well imagine a natural history museum including in an exhibit the dogs traditionally used 
by an indigenous tribe without a second thought. No, Chloe the purebred lapdog is 
objectionable to the museum because she is not “natural” enough. Her very familiar (to 
present-day Western viewers), very “unnatural” accoutrements (while perhaps 
unnecessary to give this impression, due to viewers’ already strong associations about 
lapdogs)  only underscore Chloe’s inseparability from her human companion.  
 Furthermore, it is precisely this enmeshedness between dog and human that seems 
inappropriate to not only the museum context but also in general. Although a dog as a pet 
dog does not belong in a museum, neither does a dog as a dog, so the logic goes, belong 
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on what looks to be an expensive, pristine decorative pillow (leaving aside, for a moment, 
that the dog in question is dead.) Chloe not only questions the feasibility of neatly 
categorizing life (into museum-appropriate and museum-inappropriate), but points to the 
existence of complex chiasmic relationships between humans and non-humans.  
 Of course, the relationship that Chloe illustrates is troublesome for reasons other 
than just the closeness between human and animal that it implies, and this is where 
Chloe’s critique of taxidermy comes in. For one, the human/animal closeness the piece 
reveals seems a very consumerist relationship: Chloe is not just a companion, but an 
expensive decoration, and thus an object, especially but not exclusively now that she’s 
dead. To want to keep one’s dog after she dies, and to be satisfied with her stuffed skin as 
a replacement for a living, breathing dog, reveals a desire to overcome death with money. 
(In reality, of course, all money overcomes are the more disgusting aspects of death, such 
as putrescence.)  
 This critique of a little old lady whose only comfort is to have her dead dog 
stuffed and preserved is quite obvious in and of itself; viewers didn’t really need 
Katchadourian to point this out because, although taxidermy is one logical conclusion of 
the conjunction of consumerism and pet-keeping, most viewers are probably already of 
the opinion that there is something ridiculous about preserving a dead dog for sentimental 
reasons. For scientific purposes, on the other hand, they might consider it quite 
reasonable, and this is where Chloe unsettles.  
Corrective Irony and Ironic Ecology  
 Katchadourian’s piece, I argue, offers a more productive interrogation of animal 
representation than Dion’s does. Scala Naturae decries the possibility of representation 
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by categorization while simultaneously upholding its truth, but is ultimately a dead end. 
Metaphorically, once viewers have climbed the staircase, there is nowhere to go but back 
down to where they started. Okay, got it, the great chain of being as a system of 
classification is flawed (though, of course, Dion’s comments imply, by even attempting 
such a thing, humans are superior). Perhaps even the entire project of classification is 
wrongheaded, and we should throw it out. But where do we go with that? Dion, in this 
piece at least, offers no suggestions.  
 In his 1993 essay referenced earlier, Wallace theorizes about the rampant use of 
irony in (post-) postmodern fiction; I think his ideas are applicable to art of this period as 
well. Wallace discusses the “shift in U.S. perceptions of how art was supposed to work, a 
transition from art’s being a creative instantiation of real values to art’s being a creative 
instantiation of deviance from bogus values” (178). Irony and irreverence often have 
idealist motives (for example, in satires such as Tartuffe, or even in 1960’s art and 
culture), but, since they “serve an exclusively negative function” Wallace contends, their 
constant use or overuse becomes “destructive” because they are “singularly unuseful 
when it comes to constructing anything to replace the hypocrisies [they] debunk” (183). It 
seems to me that Dion’s Scala Naturae falls into this trap: it mocks a long-discredited 
system of classification that is perhaps still subtly at work in the way we (and Dion 
himself) think about animals, but it does not allow space for new ways of thinking. 
Furthermore, while Dion’s piece makes extensive use of taxidermied animals, both as 
literal representations of animals and as figurative representations of the stiff lifelessness 
of categorizing life, Scala Naturae remains mute on the practice of taxidermy itself as 
well as on the perceived domesticity of the housecat it employs.  
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 Environmental sociologist Bronislaw Szerszynski similarly argues that the 
rampant use of irony of the postmodern era has become destructive, leading to a “crisis in 
political meaning” that, he contends, undergirds the “persistence of [environmental] 
unsustainability” (338). However,  
the solution to this crisis is not to be found in a simple restoration of 
political language’s reference to a reality outside language, as if language 
is a flapping sail that can simply be re-secured to its mast. It was the cul-
de-sac of modernity’s ‘correspondence’ theory of truth – the idea that 
language and the world are separate, and that language can be judged by 
how it more or less accurately corresponds to the world – that led to the 
crisis of representation in the first place (338). 
Szerszynski proposes that it is the overuse of what he calls “corrective irony” that is 
destructive. This type of irony has two components: first, “it operates by setting up the 
tension between two levels of meaning, only in order to more resolutely effect a 
resolution onto one of them”; second, “it positions the ironist as an outside observer of 
the irony, on the moral high ground looking down, rather than implicated in it” (347). For 
Szerszynski, corrective irony is not ironic enough, since it does not allow for the 
coexistence of multiple levels of conflicting meaning (such as those that might arise from 
different perspectives or epistemologies) in which the ironist necessarily plays a part.  
Paradoxically then, Szerszynski argues that the solution to the postmodern crisis of 
meaning and representation is a “generalized ironic stance toward the world and oneself” 
(337) that “involve[s] a reflexive awareness of the limited and provisional nature of 
human understanding, while at the same time not lapsing into cynicism or quietism” 
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(350). Szerszynski advocates for a new environmentalism, which he calls “ironic 
ecology,” that takes as its foundation this “generalized ironic stance.” 
 Chloe displays the major components of Szerszynski’s ironic ecology. Through 
the simple act of attempting to place a taxidermied pet into a natural history museum’s 
collection of faunal specimens, Katchadourian highlights Western thought’s “over-
estimation of the epistemic power of science” by hinting that “meanings and values of 
nature are […] shot through with ironies and aporias” (Szerszynsi 352). However, Chloe 
is not an attack on science; rather, the piece encourages greater reflection on the limits of 
not just scientific ways of knowing and representing “reality,” but “about the provisional 
character of normative claims” in general (Szerszynsi 352). Does a lap dog belong in a 
natural history museum? After the contemplation Chloe inspires, viewers’ initial, knee-
jerk responses to this question (whether “yes” or “no”) become less self-assured, and 
more aware of the ironies they entail. In this way, Chloe subtly embraces “a less 
moralistic and self-satisfied political style, one which acknowledges that no one can 
know political truths perfectly or live blamelessly” (Szerszynsi 352). Chloe creates a 
space in which several incompatible meanings perch, playfully entangling the viewer’s 
own perspective in the ironies the piece holds. 
  Chloe, in the end, wavers between obvious and profound, between overly 
sentimental and creepily disturbing, between ironic and sincere, between human and 
nonhuman, between familiar and strange, resisting an unambiguous reading while posing 
thought-provoking questions. As Baker observes “taxidermy animals do not seem to 
know what they are doing, what beliefs or attitudes they stand for, let alone what 
categories they do or do not fit” (Postmodern 182). When looked at individually, Scala 
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Naturae’s animals, too, seem to falter in their meaning, as their out-of-placeness on the 
stairs confers on them an attitude of resigned confusion, despite the hammering message 
of the piece’s overt structure.  
 In an interview, Katchadourian emphasizes the importance of a “mindset of trying 
to be alert to things that you are passing over all the time” to her creative process (8). 
Thus, she says, “My research and my exploration happen on a daily basis out in the 
world” (24). Haraway writes at the end of her book, “I have tried to ask how taking such 
[mundane] things seriously draws us into the world” (300). Chloe, and, to a lesser extent, 
Scala Naturae “draw us into the world” in all its complexity, irony, and familiarity. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 In this thesis, I have endeavored to show how Nina Katchadourian’s oeuvre can 
be read as subtly asserting the “lively, active, emergent, agential aspects of nature” that 
biosemiotics, trans-corporeality, and the concept of naturecultures all strive to theorize 
(Alaimo, Bodily, 143).  Katchadourian’s work, like biosemiotics, calls attention to human 
and non-human animals’ subjective ways of seeing and interpreting the world, 
emphasizing the spontaneous emergence of meaning and the creativity inherent in 
mistakes. By maintaining a radical openness to happenstance and an attentiveness to 
relationships that are often overlooked or seen as unimportant, Katchadourian employs 
what I characterize as a biosemiotic process to create her artwork. This process affirms 
the importance of playful, open-ended encounters with agential others.  
 For Katchadourian, this otherness does not stop at animality; her work also 
attends to the otherness of materiality, which, as trans-corporeality insists, paradoxically 
permeates human bodies. In her work, Katchadourian gestures toward the creativity of 
the material and living agencies that constitute the natural world while simultaneously 
acknowledging the limits of linguistic and artistic representations of nature. For 
Katchadourian, representation and meaning-making are ongoing processes which involve 
not just humans, but other living beings and the material world. As we saw in pieces such 
as Natural Crossdressing and Mended Spiderwebs #19 (Laundry Line), Katchadourian 
refuses dualistic separations between nature and culture, instead recognizing that natural 
and cultural processes are always inextricably intertwined.  
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 In attending to the complex and unpredictable interconnections between culture 
and nature, and humans and non-human animals, pieces such as Chloe evince what 
Bronislaw Szerszynski terms an “ironic ecology”: at a fundamental level, 
Katchadourian’s pieces “encourage critical reflection about the limits and assumptions” 
of linguistic and artistic representations of nature (Szerszynski 352). Furthermore, by 
highlighting that human understandings of the natural world are “not just socially situated 
and partial, but also shot through with ironies and aporias,” Katchadourian’s oeuvre 
demonstrates the creative potential in unavoidable error and failure while celebrating “a 
living, evolving plurality of shared forms of life” (Szerszynski 351-352).  
 Katchadourian’s ever-evolving piece, Paranormal Postcards (2001 to present; 
Figure 32) illustrates this plurality, or what Frances Richard refers to as a “vibrating 
network of sympathies” (46). The piece consists of an expansive collection of postcards, 
each of which Katchadourian has altered with red thread sewn through the images. The 
postcards—all from places Katchadourian herself has traveled—are displayed on a 
gallery wall in “loosely thematic” groupings with dashed lines of red graphic tape 
connecting them into a large network (“Paranormal Postcards” 382).  
 The thread in Paranormal Postcards is reminiscent of the red thread 
Katchadourian used in her Mended Spiderwebs Series, in which she “collaborated” with 
spiders to create art. Thus, the allusion to Mended Spiderwebs, as well as the word 
“paranormal” in the piece’s title, playfully suggest that Katchadourian’s is not the only 
agency at work in this piece—that other, more obscure agencies are also at work, 
agencies that are not attended to in “normal” taxonomical systems. As Richard writes, in 
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Figure 32: View of Paranormal Postcards (2001-present) by Nina Katchadourian 
Paranormal Postcards “[t]he logic of categorization breaks down, while the logic of 
relationship effloresces into new possibility” (50). 
 
 
 The piece’s red connecting threads delineate several types of relationships and 
agencies at work in and across the images. In some, the threads suggest fleeting visual 
connection, such as in the image of the Staten Island Ferry’s many windows connected to 
the Statue of Liberty33 (Figure 33). In others, the threads give objects such as buildings a 
sense of agency, as in the image of the Empire State Building “overlooking” a crowd of 
ice skaters (also in Figure 33). In many, threads connecting human and statue hands and 
non-human animals’ paws suggest playful relationships by visually alluding to the game 
                                                 
33
 Which is, ironically, nearly obscured by the dense red “sightlines”.  
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Figure 33: Detail of Paranormal 
Postcards (2001-present) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
Figure 34: Detail 
of Paranormal 
Postcards (2001-
present) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
Cat’s Cradle34 (Figure 34). Many threads also suggest communicative relationships, such 
as in the postcard of Sigmund Freud connected to his therapy dog, Jofi (Figure 35). 35 
Finally, the juxtaposition of seemingly unrelated images, such as the postcard of a 
skydiver and another of three cherubs (Figure 36), suggest flukish affinities.   
 
 
                                                 
34
 The allusion to Cat’s Cradle also emphasizes interconnectedness and perpetual evolution in that it 
consists of a piece of string being almost endlessly transformed from one “figure” to another. 
 
35
 Freud wrote that Jofi helped him evaluate and calm his patients, as well as keep track of time during 
therapy sessions (Beck).  
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Figure 35: Detail of 
Paranormal Postcards (2001-
present) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
Figure 36: Detail of Paranormal 
Postcards (2001-present) by Nina 
Katchadourian 
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 Paranormal Postcards exemplifies the worldview inherent in Katchadourian’s 
work, a “‘world view’ of extreme and almost paranoid interconnectedness”, as 
Katchadourian describes it on her website.  In this way, Paranormal Postcards, and 
Katchadourian’s work in general, embody Wendy Wheeler’s definition of responsibility:   
In our common usage, to be a responsible person is often thought about in 
terms of being practically sensible, or realistic, in a way that generally 
excludes related terms such as “sensitive.” […] But “responsibility,” as the 
word suggests, actually refers us to semiosis and to an ethos of 
responsiveness in which all signs matter, i.e. are material and real, and are 
properly acknowledged as such—and are read. Acknowledging signs sent 
[…] is of course, not straightforward. […] Meaning is not transparent […] 
But no matter how heavily our culture lies upon us, we should not forget 
that we are animals too, amongst other animals, and are not entirely 
without the capacity for responding to the natural world in which we also 
have our archaic being (Wheeler, Creature 156-7).  
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